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This report offers proposals in the hope they may inform development of a more integrated and 
coherent legal regime for the carbon cycle. Regulation of the carbon cycle should be guided by 
Australia’s national and international commitments to address climate change through the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions and work towards ecologically sustainable development. While much 
progress has been made by the Commonwealth Government in addressing the issues of climate 
change and ecologically sustainable development, we believe that a stronger legal framework is 
needed at a federal and state level. Legal frameworks must effectively regulate activities that produce 
greenhouse gas emissions and activities that sequester greenhouse gas emissions.  This report 
evaluates the current Australian approach to regulation of the carbon cycle and offers 
recommendations for reform.  
This report was made possible by funding from the Australian Research Council. Information 
contained in the report constitutes the outcomes of Discovery Grant DP 1094061 entitled: ‘An 
Integrated Legal Regime for a Sustainable Carbon Cycle’. Research for this project was undertaken 
from 2010 to 2013 by the following chief investigators: Professor Sharon Christensen, Professor W D 
Duncan, Professor Douglas Fisher, Associate Professor Pamela O’Connor and Dr Nicola Swayne 
(formerly Durrant).  
The findings of this project were published as a series of journal articles (see project publications lists 
at page 80). This report makes a number of recommendations based on the findings of the project. 
Recommendations are expressed in a general form for consideration by appropriate state and federal 
government authorities and legislatures. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge our colleagues Professor Douglas Fisher and Dr Nicola Swayne 
of Queensland University of Technology for their advice and comments.  
 
Professor Sharon Christensen              Queensland University of Technology 
 
Professor WD Duncan                            Queensland University of Technology  
 
Associate Professor Pamela O’Connor    Monash University 
 
Angela Phillips    Queensland University of Technology 
 
April 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Contents 
1. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................... 6 
PART A: THE CARBON CYCLE AND LEGAL REGIME ................................................................. 8 
2. What is the carbon cycle? ............................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 The natural carbon cycle ......................................................................................................... 9 
2.2. Anthropogenic changes to the carbon cycle.................................................................................. 10 
2.3. The carbon cycle and climate change ........................................................................................... 12 
3. The Current Legal Regime Governing the Carbon Cycle ............................................................. 13 
3.1 International, national and state context................................................................................ 13 
3.1.1 International .................................................................................................................. 13 
3.1.2 National Laws ............................................................................................................... 15 
3.1.3 State Laws ..................................................................................................................... 17 
4. Overview of Legislative Case Studies .......................................................................................... 19 
5. Legislative Case Study One – Coal mining and Coal Seam Gas in Queensland .......................... 21 
5.1 Overview Case Study One .................................................................................................... 21 
5.2 Environmental Impacts of Extraction Activities ................................................................... 22 
5.2.1 Regulatory Framework ................................................................................................. 22 
5.2.2 Environmental impacts from coal seam gas extraction – Queensland study ................ 24 
5.2.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 30 
5.3 Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Extraction Activities ........................................ 31 
5.3.1. EIA process ................................................................................................................... 31 
5.3.2. Approval stage .............................................................................................................. 32 
5.3.3. Conditions of approval .................................................................................................. 33 
5.4 Managing Access to Private Land for Extraction Activities ................................................. 34 
5.4.1 The Land Access Code ........................................................................................................ 35 
5.4.2 The statutory process for land access ................................................................................... 35 
5.5. Conclusions and Recommendations for Reform........................................................................ 37 
5.5.1  Regulation of environmental impacts ................................................................................. 37 
5.5.2  Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions............................................................................. 38 
5.5.3 Regulation of access to private land..................................................................................... 38 
6. Legislative Case Study Two – Coal Fired Electricity Generation ................................................ 40 
6.1 Overview Case Study Two ......................................................................................................... 40 
6.2 National Framework - Carbon Pricing Mechanism .................................................................... 40 
6.2.1 Operation of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism ....................................................................... 41 
6.2.2 Effectiveness of CPM for reducing emissions from coal fired electricity  generation ....... 43 
6.3 Impacts on effectiveness of CPM to reduce emissions ............................................................... 45 
4 
 
6.3.1 Role of environmental and planning laws ............................................................................ 45 
6.3.2 Other legal instruments to reduce emissions ........................................................................ 46 
6.3.3 Impact of transitional assistance for coal-fired generators ................................................... 46 
6.4 Conclusions and Recommended Reform .................................................................................... 48 
7. Legislative Case Study Three – Carbon Capture and Storage ...................................................... 49 
7.1 Overview Case Study Three ....................................................................................................... 49 
7.2 Overview of legal regime for carbon capture and storage .......................................................... 50 
7.3 Approval process for CCS projects ............................................................................................. 51 
7.4 Managing the risk of environmental harm .................................................................................. 53 
7.4.1 Operational phase of carbon capture and storage projects ................................................... 53 
7.4.2 Closure of carbon capture and storage projects ................................................................... 53 
7.5 Responsibility for environmental harm ....................................................................................... 54 
7.5.1 Responsibility for carbon dioxide leakage under the carbon pricing mechanism ................ 56 
7.6 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 56 
8. Legislative Case Study Four – Biological Sequestration .............................................................. 58 
8.1 Overview Case Study Four ......................................................................................................... 58 
8.2 Australian legal framework for biosequestration ........................................................................ 59 
8.3 Approval of CFI offsets project .................................................................................................. 61 
8.4 Offsets project secured by interest in land .................................................................................. 62 
8.5 Enforcement by Clean Energy Regulator ................................................................................... 64 
8.6 Link between ACCUs and the carbon pool ................................................................................ 65 
8.7 Critique of the legal framework for biosequestration ................................................................. 66 
8.7.1 Underspecification of state carbon sequestration rights ....................................................... 66 
8.7.2 Carbon maintenance obligations over private land .............................................................. 68 
8.7.3 The surrender of ACCUs under the carbon pricing mechanism .......................................... 69 
8.8 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 69 
PART C: COMMON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM ........................... 70 
9. Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 71 
10. Project Publications List ............................................................................................................... 78 
11. Glossary ........................................................................................................................................ 79 
12. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 80 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
1. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
RECOMMENDATION 1: INTEGRATION OF THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF ESD  
 
The concept and principles of ESD should be integrated into legislation governing all stages of the 
carbon cycle. ESD principles should be clearly set out in the objects of legislation and integrated into 
approval processes for projects across the carbon cycle. Legislation should mandate consideration of 
economic, social and environmental factors for approval of activities with the potential to cause 
environmental harm. Legislative requirements to consider and address greenhouse gas emissions from 
mining, petroleum and electricity projects will also be necessary to ensure ESD.  
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 2: INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND STATE 
POLICIES AND LAWS  
 
(i) . Integration of laws for the carbon cycle will result in greater emissions reductions and more 
sustainable environmental outcomes.  International, national and state climate change and 
environmental policy and legislation should be integrated to provide interoperability of laws at all 
stages of the carbon cycle.  
(ii) State laws should also be integrated to ensure that nationally consistent legal standards exist for 
sequestration projects.  
(iii) Legal instruments such as the carbon pricing mechanism must be designed to work together with 
other regulatory schemes.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 3: RIGHTS TO CARBON MUST BE CLEAR AND FULLY 
SPECIFIED 
 
When new forms of carbon rights are created, these rights should be fully specified by statute. Neither 
traditional categories of property nor statutory agreements are an adequate source for specifying 
carbon rights. Traditional rules of property and land ownership are not flexible enough and statutory 
agreements are too variable. Furthermore, the use of statutory agreements will create significant legal 
uncertainty regarding their enforceability and lead to additional transactional costs for third parties. 
Legislation must clarify ownership and rights to access, extract, transform and sequester all forms of 
carbon. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4: INTEGRATION OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
 
The use of an adaptive management approach may be effective to govern activities with a high risk of 
environmental harm. Government policy for adaptive management must be integrated into the 
legislative framework. Regulators must have comprehensive powers to respond to emerging 
information about environmental impacts and harm, including powers to suspend or cancel projects. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 5: MANAGING THE INFORMATION COSTS OF NEW PROPERTY 
Transparency of rights to carbon is necessary to facilitate dealings and reduce information costs. All 
forms of statutory agreements expressed to bind successors in title should be recorded and searchable 
through the land information system available to the public, and a mechanism introduced for 
prospective purchasers, mortgagees and lessees to obtain a copy. Likewise restrictions attaching to a 
landowner’s title, such as under the Carbon Farming Act should be recorded on the land title register 
or land information system. Consideration should be given to the role of the land title register in 
making interests in land and restrictions arising from carbon rights publicly available. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6: ALLOCATION OF LONG-TERM RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PROJECTS ACROSS THE CARBON CYCLE 
The long-term risks of environmental harm cannot be adequately managed through tortious or 
contractual means. To protect the public interest over the longer term, responsibility for 
environmental harm from extraction and sequestration activities must be clearly allocated by statute.  
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2. What is the carbon cycle? 
2.1 The natural carbon cycle 
The carbon cycle is a dynamic natural process which regulates the amount of carbon in the 
atmosphere, ocean and land surface (trees, vegetation and soil) at any given time. Carbon dioxide 
cycles between the atmosphere, ocean and land surface. It is absorbed by the ocean through sea 
surface gas exchange and the land surface through photosynthesis. Once absorbed, it is stored in 
ocean sediments, organic plant matter or is eventually converted from organic plant matter into fossil 
fuels over thousands of years. Carbon dioxide is also emitted by the ocean through sea surface gas 
exchange with the atmosphere, and by the land surface through respiration of plants and animals, 
decay of biomass and natural events such as fire. At all times, large amounts of carbon are stored in 
the oceans, fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum and natural gas (which effectively isolate carbon from 
the cycle), living plants and organic matter in the soil.
1
 The following diagram demonstrates the 
natural carbon cycle in a simple form: 
Figure 1: The Natural Carbon Cycle
2
 
 
 
 
 
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are determined by the balance between sources 
(emissions of the gas from natural systems) and sinks (the removal of the gas from the atmosphere by 
                                                          
1 Garnaut R, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final report (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 35.  
2 Image originally published on Pass IELTS Higher website and reproduced here with permission: © 2013, 
www.passieltshigher.com <http://www.passieltshigher.com>. 
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oceans and the land surface).
3
 Natural inflows and outflows of carbon to the atmosphere were 
approximately equal for several thousands of years prior to the industrial revolution in the late 18
th
 
and early 19
th
 centuries.
4
 The industrial revolution brought about significant anthropogenic (human-
induced) changes to the carbon cycle. 
 
2.2.   Anthropogenic changes to the carbon cycle 
The most significant anthropogenic change to the carbon cycle has been the extraction and 
transformation of fossil fuels into energy, greatly increasing the amount of carbon dioxide emitted 
into the atmosphere. Emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion
5
 are responsible for 
more than 75% of the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations since pre-industrial 
times.
6
   
 
Changes in land use, such as increased deforestation and changing agricultural practices, have also 
altered the natural carbon cycle and increased carbon dioxide emissions. The remainder of the 
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide since pre-industrial times is attributable to land use changes.
7
 
Increased carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere are partly offset by natural carbon dioxide 
‘sinks’ on both the land surface and oceans.8 Natural sinks have continued to remove around half of 
all atmospheric carbon emissions in the past 50 years.
9
 Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide 
would be greater without these natural sinks but have nonetheless risen considerably since the 
industrial revolution. 
 
Since 1750, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen, at an increasing rate, 
from around 280 parts per million (ppm) to nearly 380 ppm in 2005.
10
 Anthropogenic changes to the 
carbon cycle and the corresponding increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations is 
demonstrated in the following diagram: 
 
                                                          
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 512.  
4 Garnaut R, The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response to Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2011) 3. 
5 With contributions from cement manufacture. 
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3, 512. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Garnaut, The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response to Climate Change, above n 4, 3-4.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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Figure 2: The Carbon Cycle with anthropogenic interference
11
  
 
Main points: 
 The natural carbon cycle resulted in approximately equal inflows and outflows of carbon dioxide 
between the atmosphere, oceans and land surface prior to human interference 
The key stages of the carbon cycle are as follows: 
 Extraction of fossil carbon in the form of coal, oil and gas, resulting in carbon dioxide emissions 
to the atmosphere..This is shown in the bottom left hand corner of the diagram.   
 Transformation of carbon through the burning of fossil fuels, resulting in carbon dioxide 
emissions to the atmosphere. This is also shown in the bottom left hand corner of the diagram.   
 Storage of carbon through biosequestration of carbon from the atmosphere back onto the land 
surface (trees, vegetation and soil). This decreases the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere and is shown in the top right hand corner of the diagram.  
 Although it is not shown in the diagram, geosequestration of carbon into underground geological 
formations is a key anthropogenic stage of the carbon cycle. Geosequestration involves the 
capture of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion, followed by transport and permanent 
storage of the carbon dioxide in an underground geological formation. This process will reduce 
the amount of emissions resulting from transformation of carbon and is therefore an important 
strategy for the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
                                                          
11 Image originally published by Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage and reproduced here with permission. It can be found 
at <http://www.scifun.ed.ac.uk/downloads/ccs/Carbon-cycle.jpg>.   
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2.3.   The carbon cycle and climate change  
The substantial increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations has led to observable effects on 
the global climate, known categorically as ‘climate change’. It is widely acknowledged that climate 
change is occurring, primarily due to large-scale anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
12
 
Internationally, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has increased scientific certainty 
surrounding the threat of climate change and has stated that the warming of the climate system is 
‘unequivocal’.13 
Climate change observed to date includes a rise in average global air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level.
14
 Further observations 
include more intense and longer droughts over wider areas, an increase in the frequency of heavy 
rainfall events, and an increase in the frequency of heatwaves.
15
 
Projections of future climate change include further increases in global average air and ocean 
temperatures, contraction of snow cover, shrinking of sea ice in both the Arctic and Antarctic, 
increase in the frequency of hot extremes, heat waves and heavy rainfall events, and an increase in the 
intensity of tropical cyclones.
16
 
For Australia in particular, effects of climate change are likely to include increased frequency of 
drought, decline in agricultural production, potential destruction of coral reefs, reduction in water 
availability, increased magnitude of storm events, and decline in biodiversity including heightened 
extinction rates.
17
 The potential effects of climate change have been brought into focus recently due to 
a series of severe weather events in Australia, such as the 2009 Victorian bushfires and the 2011 and 
2013 Queensland cyclones and floods. Although it cannot be concluded with scientific certainty that 
individual weather events were ‘caused’ by climate change, events may be assessed for their 
consistency with expectations for a warming world.
18
 The extreme conditions that were the backdrop 
to these severe weather events will be more likely to occur and will occur more often in a warmer 
world.
19
 
Future projections of climate change may be affected by a number of factors such as ‘carbon cycle-
climate feedbacks’. This type of feedback affects the total uptake of carbon dioxide by ocean and 
land-based sinks. Warming of the climate system reduces the absorption of carbon dioxide by the 
                                                          
12 Garnaut R, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at xxxv and 183.  
13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3, 5. 
14 Ibid. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states it is very likely that most of the observed increase in global 
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations: 10. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid 12-17. 
17 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report, above n 12, ch 6: Climate Change Impacts on Australia. As 
informed by numerous scientific reports including: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and 
Bureau of Meteorology, Climate Change in Australia: Technical Report 2007 (CSIRO, 2007); Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3; Pittock B (ed), Climate Change: 
An Australian Guide to the Science and Potential Impacts (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2003); PMSEIC (Prime Minister’s 
Science, Engineering and Innovation Council) Independent Working Group 2007, Climate Change in Australia: Regional 
Impacts and Adaptation – Managing the Risk for Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007); Jones R and Preston B, 
Climate Change Impacts on Australia and the Benefits of Early Action to Reduce Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
(CSIRO, 2006). For further discussion of the impacts of climate change on Australia see Durrant N, Legal Responses to 
Climate Change (The Federation Press, 2010) ch 2. 
18 Garnaut, The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global Response to Climate Change, above n 4, 6. 
19 Ibid.  
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ocean and land surface, increasing the fraction of carbon dioxide that remains in the atmosphere.
20
 
Furthermore, carbon dioxide has an extremely long atmospheric lifetime. Once emitted, 50% of 
carbon dioxide will be removed within thirty years, a further 30% will be removed within a few 
centuries, and the other 20% may remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years.
21
 This means that 
approximately half of all past and current anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will remain in the 
atmosphere for centuries, and continue to contribute to warming of the global climate for hundreds of 
years to come.
22
 Hence, policy decisions made now regarding anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
emissions have the potential to either avoid or ‘lock in’ a certain level of climate change for 
generations for come.  
 
3. The Current Legal Regime Governing the Carbon Cycle 
Numerous laws at international, national and state level purport to regulate different stages or aspects 
of the biological carbon cycle. Historically, the Australian legal regime has focussed on the regulation 
of access to and extraction of fossil fuels, and their subsequent transformation into energy. 
Sophisticated laws therefore exist in each Australian jurisdiction for the regulation of rights to exploit 
carbon reserves on land by extraction, sale and use to generate energy. Only more recently have 
Australian laws sought to regulate emissions from these activities either through schemes for the 
reduction of emissions (carbon pricing mechanism) or the creation of offset schemes to mitigate 
emissions, such as sequestration of carbon in biological sinks (forests, vegetation) and geological 
reservoirs (underground storage formations). The laws in these areas are in their infancy and as this 
report demonstrates the laws require further investigation and consideration by regulators to achieve 
the desired result of an integrated regulatory framework. A major finding from the research is that 
regulators face significant challenges in implementing an integrated regulatory approach for the 
reduction and mitigation of emissions due to the fragmented nature of current laws which operate at 
different levels of government.  
The national and international legal and policy context contributing to the current fragmented 
approach to regulation of the carbon cycle in Australia is outlined below.  
3.1 International, national and state context  
 
3.1.1 International 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol and 
United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development are international instruments that 
impact upon regulation of the carbon cycle in Australia. Australia is a party to all of these agreements.  
                                                          
20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3, 13.  
21 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3, 501. 
22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 3, 17. 
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The UNFCCC has the ultimate objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.
23
 Under the UNFCCC, Australia is obliged to: 
(a) adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change 
by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs;
24
 and 
(b) identify and periodically review policies and practices that encourage activities that lead to 
greater levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
25
 
The Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. It imposes binding 
emissions reduction targets upon developed country parties and establishes a framework for the 
achievement of these targets, including rules for international emissions trading and the creation of 
offsets projects in developed and developing countries. Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 
and became bound to comply with its provisions from 11 March 2008. Under the first commitment 
period of the Protocol, Australia was required to reduce its national greenhouse gas emissions to 108 
per cent of 1990 levels by 2012.
26
 The second commitment period will be from 1 January 2013 until 
31 December 2020.
27
 For this period, Australia has committed to reducing its national greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020, and up to 15-25% below 2000 levels by 
2020 depending on the strength of a global agreement beyond 2012.
28
 International negotiations for 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol are ongoing and parties must revisit their 
emissions reductions commitments for this period by 2014 at the latest.
29
 These emissions reductions 
targets apply to a group of seven greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide.
30
  
Australia is also a party to the United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
This international agreement recognises the need for ecologically sustainable development (ESD),
31
 
which is defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.32 The Rio Declaration sets out principles to 
                                                          
23 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 849 (entered into 
force on 21 March 1994) (‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’) art 2.  
24 Ibid art 4(2)(a); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 
December 1997, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force on 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’) arts 2(1) and 10. 
25 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 23, art 4(2)(e). 
26 Kyoto Protocol, above n 24, art 3(1).  
27 Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol –Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant 
to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9 (8 December 2012) at Draft decision -/CMP.8 (‘Outcome of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol –Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9’) art 4.  
28 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009 – Addendum – Part 2: Action Taken by 
the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) at Decision 2/CP.15, Art 2, 
Appendix 1. 
29 Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol –Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant 
to its Article 3, paragraph 9, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9 (8 December 2012) at Draft decision -/CMP.8, Art 7. (Doha draft 
decision -/CMP.8, Art 7) 
30 Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol –
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9, above n 27, annex I (B).  
31 First recognised internationally in the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Our 
Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987) (‘Our Common Future’) at ch 2 and Report of the United Nations 
Conference on 
Environment and Development, AlCONF.l5/26/Rev.l Vol I (12 August 1992) (‘Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development’) at annex 1, principles 3 and 4. 
32 Our Common Future, above n 31, ch 2. 
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guide parties in the implementation of ESD (‘principles of ESD’). Principle 11 requires parties to 
enact effective environmental legislation reflecting the environmental and development context to 
which it applies. A precautionary approach must be applied which requires that where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, a lack of full scientific certainty is not a reason to postpone 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
33
 This is known as the ‘precautionary 
principle’. The Rio Declaration also obliges parties to promote the internalisation of environmental 
costs through the approach that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution, and to ensure that the 
right to development is fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of 
present and future generations. These responsibilities are known as the ‘polluter pays’ principle and 
the intergenerational equity principle respectively.   
 
 
3.1.2 National Laws 
Australia has made progress towards implementing its international obligations on a national level. 
First, international commitments to reduce emissions under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have 
been translated into a national emissions reduction target of 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 and 
80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050.
34
 Australia’s international commitments to ecologically 
sustainable development are implemented through the National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable 
Development and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment.
35
 The Australian government 
sets the policy agenda nationally and passes laws that are within its legislative power. Heads of 
legislative power are set out in the Commonwealth Constitution and all national legislation must be 
supported by one or more of these heads. For example, legislation implementing national climate 
change policy could be based upon the ‘external affairs’ head of power in the Commonwealth 
Constitution.
36
  
The two main policy areas of relevance to the carbon cycle are climate change policy and energy 
policy. Currently the cornerstone of national climate change policy is the Clean Energy Future Plan, 
which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and drive investment in clean energy. National 
climate change policy is constantly evolving and there is a lack of bipartisan agreement on major 
issues. Implementation of this policy has resulted in the following legislation: 
 The Clean Energy Legislative Package – the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), Clean Energy 
Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) and associated legislation work together to implement the carbon 
pricing mechanism. The carbon pricing mechanism places a price on each tonne of carbon 
dioxide emitted which large-scale emitters must pay. Obligations to report greenhouse gas 
emissions are also placed upon large-scale emitters through the National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth). 
 
 The Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) – the carbon pricing 
mechanism does not cover Australia’s land and agriculture sector. This Act introduces a 
                                                          
33 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, above n 31, principle 15.  
34 Australian Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan (10 July 
2011) xi <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-content/uploads /2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf>. The ‘external 
affairs’ power can be used to enact legislation for the implementation of international environmental agreements: 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. This would include international agreements on climate change such as the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
35  Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1 May 1992); Ecologically Sustainable 
Development Steering Committee, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (Commonwealth of 
Australia, December 1992). 
36 Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxix). 
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scheme which allows landowners and land managers to participate in the carbon pricing 
mechanism by earning carbon offset credits for undertaking projects that reduce or sequester 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
  
Energy policy is of high importance due to Australia’s heavy reliance upon fossil fuel resources. 
Fossil fuels, particularly coal, comprise a large percentage of Australia’s export market37 and provide 
reliable and relatively cheap energy generation. The current national policy is to encourage further 
development of Australia’s fossil fuel resources,38 ensure the provision of accessible, reliable and 
competitively priced energy, enhance Australia’s domestic and export growth potential and deliver 
clean and sustainable energy.
39
 
A key point of policy integration between climate change and energy is the need to recognise and 
integrate principles of ecologically sustainable development (ESD) within the legal framework. One 
of the major difficulties with the integration of ESD within existing policies and laws is that most 
major emissions generating activities are regulated by State laws. While the Australian government 
has had input at a policy level through the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment and the 
National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development, implementation of this agreement is 
dependent upon State co-operation. The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment provides 
for the division of responsibility for environmental matters between the Commonwealth, States and 
Territories. All parties have agreed that environmental policy and decision-making should be 
governed by a number of principles, including the precautionary principle, the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle and the effective integration of economic and environmental considerations into decision-
making processes.
40
 The National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development sets out 
Australia’s overarching goal of achieving ecologically sustainable development.41 It also sets out 
several guiding principles such as the precautionary principle, the adoption of cost effective and 
flexible policy instruments and the need for decision-making processes to effectively integrate both 
long and short-term economic, environmental, social and equity considerations.  
 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) gives effect to the 
National Strategy. The aims to promote ecologically sustainable development through the 
conservation and ecologically sustainable use of natural resources.
42
 The Act is limited in application 
to ‘matters of national environmental significance’43 and therefore does not apply to a number of 
State-based activities. 
 
                                                          
37 For example, $40.97 billion worth of coal was exported to 37 countries from Queensland alone in the 2008-2009 financial 
year, and there is increasing demand from international buyers: Department of Employment, Economic Development and 
Innovation, Queensland’s Coal – Mines and Advanced Projects (Queensland Government, June 2010) at 1. 
38  See Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Our Department (27 March 2013)  
<http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/about/dept/Pages/OurDepartment.aspx>.   
39 Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Energy White Paper 2012: Australia’s Energy 
Transformation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012) xvii. 
40 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, s 3.  
41 Defined specifically as ‘development that improves the total quality of life, both now and in the future, in a way that 
maintains the ecological processes on which life depends’: National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, 
above n 35, pt 1. 
42 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 (1)(b). 
43 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s 67 and Pt 3. Currently “matters of national 
environmental significance” are limited to World Heritage properties, National Heritage properties, Wetlands of 
international importance (Ramsar Wetlands), nationally listed threatened species and ecological communities, listed 
migratory bird species, protection of the environment from nuclear actions, Commonwealth marine areas and the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park: ss 12-24C. 
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3.1.3  State Laws 
State laws and policies play a key role in the development of an integrated legal framework for 
regulation of the carbon cycle to achieve economic, environmental and social goals. As part of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment States have agreed to integrate environmental 
considerations into government decision-making processes, and to ensure that policy making and 
program implementation is informed by the principles of ESD.
44
  
The ability of the Australian government to force States to comply with this agreement is limited due 
to the constitutional limits on the power of the Australian government. The majority of laws 
regulating the extraction, transformation and storage of carbon in its different forms have a connection 
to land ownership or use. The power to legislate for the use of land or in relation to rights over land is 
exclusively within the power of the States.   
State governments have sophisticated law for the regulation of access to and extraction of fossil fuels, 
and their subsequent transformation into energy. The laws in each Australian jurisdiction are similar 
and generally require government approvals for mining activities.
45
 Several States have reviewed their 
mining legislation to record ESD principles as part of the objects of the legislation,
46
 but in most cases 
the legislation does not mandate consideration of ESD principles in the decision making process for 
the grant of approval or conditions of carrying out the activities. Whether ESD principles are given 
due weight in the decision making process therefore varies between jurisdictions.  A failure to take 
ESD into account impacts on the effectiveness of policies for the reduction of emissions from these 
activities. 
The State’s agreement to include ESD principles also extends to laws for the mitigation of emissions. 
Strategies for mitigating emissions include carbon capture and storage (CCS), sequestration of carbon 
in biological sinks (forests, vegetation); environmental offset schemes; the carbon farming initiative 
and the carbon pricing mechanism. Where the strategy requires the use of land its success is 
dependent upon appropriate regulation at the State level. Land use is an aspect of all of the above 
strategies except for the carbon pricing mechanism. Again the legislative approach in each State is 
different with principles of ESD integrated within decision making to various degrees.  Most states 
approach the issue of climate change and ESD through specific legislation with discrete mechanisms. 
For most States legislate separately to regulate coal mining, extraction of coal seal gas and petroleum, 
general environmental issues and planning and land use issues. A different approach has emerged in 
Victoria where the Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) provides whole of government approach to 
management of climate change and reduction of emissions. While this represents a positive step 
toward an integrated approach, the mechanisms for achieving the objective of the legislation, 
including consideration of ESD principles in decision making, are fragmented across legislation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, ss 3.4, 3.5. 
45 Mineral Titles Act (NT) 40(2); Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) ss 235, 402; Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 
(Tas) s 69; Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 (Vic) s 8; Mining Act 1992 (NSW) s 5; Mining Act 1971 
(SA) s 74; Mining Act 1978 (WA), ss 85 and 155; Petroleum Act (NT), s 105; Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 
(SA), ss 10(1)(c) and 11; Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Resources Act 1967 (WA), s 49(1); Petroleum (Onshore) Act 
1991 (NSW), s 7; Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT), s 199; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 
(Qld), s 800. 
46  See for example Mining Act 1992 (NSW), s 3A; Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 (Qld) s 3(1)(a)(i); 
Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) s 2(d) (‘encourage environmental responsibility in prospecting, exploring and mining’). 
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19 
 
4. Overview of Legislative Case Studies 
In response to international obligations, Australia’s legal framework aims to address reduction or 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change as 
required by the UNFCCC, and to meet national emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.  
The achievement of emissions targets requires the integration of principles of ESD into statutory 
frameworks for the approval of emission intensive activities, such as coal mining, coal seam gas 
extraction and electricity generation and the establishment of mitigation strategies such as carbon 
capture and storage or biological sequestration.  
ESD requires the present generation to ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the 
environment is maintained or enhanced for the benefit of future generations.
47
 The proper integration 
of ESD within a legislative framework requires the following elements: 
(a) decision-making criteria should effectively integrate both long and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and equity considerations;
48
  
(b) the scheme should ensure that  those who generate pollution and waste should bear the cost of 
containment, avoidance or abatement;
49
 
(c) a lack of full scientific certainty regarding serious or irreversible environmental harm should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent the harm.
50
 
The biological carbon cycle is a finely balanced and interconnected process across land, air, and 
water. The legal regime however, does not mirror the biological process, instead regulating human 
interference that has the potential for environmental harm. The focus of regulatory laws and 
instruments is on the stages of extraction, emission and storage as represented in the diagram below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, s 3.5.2; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, above n 31, principle 3. 
48 Ecologically Sustainable Development Steering Committee, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, 
above n 35, pt 1; Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, s 3.2; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, above n 31, principle 11. 
49 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, s 3.5.4; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, above n 31, principle 16. 
50 National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, above n 35, pt 1; Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment, above n 35, s 3.5.1; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, above n 31, principle 15. See Telstra v 
Hornsby Shire Council [2006] NSWLEC 133 at [128] per Preston CJ and Brown C.   
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The report adopts a case study approach to the examination of regulation of the carbon cycle for a 
number of reasons. First the regulation of land use and activities on land is within the legislative 
control of the State governments. Secondly, as a result there is significant diversity in the legislative 
approach to the regulation of emission intensive activities and mitigation strategies.  Thirdly, the 
adoption of a case study method allows for an in-depth examination of specific State regulatory 
models and their strengths and weaknesses. Particular jurisdictions are chosen for individual case 
studies dependent upon the stage of development of laws within the jurisdiction and whether the laws 
were an appropriate exemplar of the approach adopted at State level. 
The interaction and conflict between two State policy areas, climate change and resource 
development, are considered through the case studies. As highlighted above most states approach the 
issue of climate change and ESD through specific legislation with discrete mechanisms for separate 
regulation of coal mining, extraction of coal seal gas and petroleum. The case studies will consider the 
effectiveness of this fragmented approach in contrast to the whole of government approach in 
Victoria.  
The case studies at pages 23 to 50 will focus first on laws purporting to regulate emissions intensive 
activities of mining and electricity generation and whether the approval processes for those activities 
effectively integrates ESD principles. As previously highlighted, the laws regulating the approval 
process for access, extraction and transformation of carbon within the ground are highly developed. 
Traditionally these laws have focussed on economic considerations related to the granting of the 
mining tenure, payment of royalties and rights upon extraction. It would require a significant change 
of policy and practice to integrate social and environmental aspects of ESD principles in the approval 
process. . The cases studies examine the extent to which principles of ESD are currently incorporated 
within the decision making process, and how the legislative frameworks regulate the environmental 
impacts and the social impacts upon landowners resulting from access, extraction and transformation 
of carbon in the ground.   
The second group of case studies at pages 51 to 71 examines the mitigation strategies of carbon 
capture and storage underground (geosequestration) and biological sequestration. ESD principles are 
relevant at the approval stage and can also affect the framing of conditions upon approval of the 
activity.  The laws need to carefully balance the potential mitigation benefits with social and 
economic impacts, particularly where uncertainty exists in relation to the environmental impact of 
new technology, such as CCS.  A clear and stable legal framework is also needed for sequestration 
projects to ensure that these novel activities are consistently regulated and commercially attractive to 
private entities. These case studies will examine the extent to which legal frameworks effectively 
integrate environmental, social and economic factors to ensure that each new mitigation strategy is a 
form of ecologically sustainable development.   
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5. Legislative Case Study One – Coal mining and Coal Seam Gas in Queensland 
 
5.1 Overview Case Study One 
 
The first case study considers two processes for the extraction of carbon from the ground, coal mining 
and the extraction of coal seam gas.
51
 This case study was chosen due to the significant role that coal 
mining plays in Australia’s economy and the projected growth of coal seam gas extraction, 
particularly in Queensland.
52
 The Queensland legislative framework was chosen for a number of 
reasons. Queensland mining is responsible for the production and export of the largest amount of coal 
in Australia. The framework governing approvals, access, and extracting of coal is similar to that of 
other jurisdictions, and therefore conclusions will be applicable to other jurisdictions.  Queensland is 
also the first state to grapple with legal challenges of a legislative framework for the approval, access 
and extraction of coal seam gas and therefore provides the most appropriate exemplar.
53
  
Regulation of coal mining and coal seam gas extraction has several purposes aligned with 
Queensland’s resource development and environmental policies. First, the primary purpose of the 
regulation is to encourage and facilitate growth of coal mining and coal seam gas extraction.
54
 
Queensland legislation also provides that a significant aim of the regulation is to manage the 
development of coal and coal seam gas resources in an ecologically sustainable manner.
55
 The stated 
aim is consistent with the desire to integrate ESD principles within the regulatory framework. The 
case study will examine several key aspects of the regulatory framework where the integration of ESD 
principles should play a key role: 
(i) assessment of the environmental impact of the extraction activities and what 
environmental controls and penalties consistent with ESD principles should be 
implemented; 
(ii) assessment of the impact of the extraction activities on greenhouse gas emissions and 
what controls are or should be implemented to reduce or mitigate emissions; and  
(iii) rights of access over private land to conduct extracting activities, the impact of those 
rights on other users of the land and how access rights should be regulated to ensure ESD. 
 
 
                                                          
51 Material in this case study was originally published in the following sources and is reproduced here with the permission of 
the publisher: Sharon Christensen, Nicola Durrant, Pamela O'Connor and Angela Phillips, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Coal Mining Activities in the Context of Climate Change’ (2011) 28(6) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 1; Sharon Christensen, Pamela O'Connor, W D Duncan and Angela Phillips, ‘Regulation of Land Access for 
Resource Development: A coal seam gas case study from Queensland’ (2012) 21(2) Australian Property Law Journal 110; 
Nicola Swayne, ‘Regulating Coal Seam Gas in Queensland: Lessons in an adaptive environmental management approach?’ 
(2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 163. The material contained in this case study is also further developed 
in the forthcoming publication: Pamela O'Connor, ‘Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The 
problem of measurement costs’ Monash Law Review (In Press, 2013). 
52 Australian Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Australia’s Coal Industry (15 August 2012) 
<http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/mining/australian_mineral_commodities/coal/Pages/australia_coal_industry.aspx>; Energy 
White Paper 2012: Australia’s Energy Transformation, above n 39, executive summary. 
53 Exploration and production of coal seam gas is also currently occurring on a small scale in New South Wales: see New 
South Wales Government, Coal Seam Gas: Informing the community <http://www.csg.nsw.gov.au/home>.   
54 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) s 2; Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 (Qld) s 3(1). 
55 Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 (Qld) s 3(1)(a)(i). Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) s 2(d) 
(‘encourage environmental responsibility in prospecting, exploring and mining’).  
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5.2 Environmental Impacts of Extraction Activities 
 
In Queensland and all other Australian jurisdictions, ownership of subterranean coal and coal seam 
gas is statutorily vested in the Crown.
56
 The Crown may grant private entities rights to extract coal 
and coal seam gas pursuant to a mining or petroleum tenement. Once the coal or coal seam gas has 
been extracted in accordance with the tenement, ownership will pass to the tenement holder.
57
  
Mining and petroleum tenements confer significant rights on their holders. Most notably, rights to 
extract coal or coal seam gas are conferred, along with rights to conduct incidental or ancillary 
activities.
58
 Extraction activities result in a number of environmental impacts including impacts on 
surrounding land and water resources and emission of greenhouse gases. Regulation of coal mining 
and coal seam gas extraction must address these environmental impacts in order to ensure that carbon 
resources are developed in an ecologically sustainable manner.  
This section of the case study examines the regulation of environmental impacts from coal mining and 
coal seam gas extraction, using Queensland’s regime for environmental impacts from coal seam gas 
extraction as an example. 
The next section of the case study considers the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions as a specific 
environmental impact from coal mining and coal seam gas extraction.   
 
5.2.1 Regulatory Framework 
 
Environmental impacts from coal mining and coal seam gas extraction are regulated through the 
approval process, the conditions of approval imposed, and any applicable legislative obligations. All 
necessary approvals must be obtained before coal mining or coal seam gas extraction can be carried 
out.  
The first requirement is the obtaining of a mining or petroleum tenement.
59
 The procedure generally 
requires public notice of application, a period open for public objections or submissions relating to the 
application, and finally a decision by the responsible minister.
60
 There are mandatory or discretionary 
considerations that the minister must take into account when deciding to grant or refuse the 
application for a mining or petroleum tenement.
61
 Secondly, a tenement holder must hold an 
                                                          
56 See Christensen et al, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Coal Mining Activities in the Context of Climate 
Change’, above n 51, 386-387.  
57 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 310; Mining Act 1978 (WA), s 85(2)(b); Bereth v Lehmann [2011] WASC 144 at 
[38]; Finesky Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport for Western Australia [2001] WASC 87 at [153]; Mining Act 1992 
(NSW), s 11(1); Mining Act 1971 (SA), s 18; King v Der [2010] NSWLEC 1249 at [31]; Petroleum and Geothermal Energy 
Act 2000 (SA), s 5(2); Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Resources Act 1967 (WA), s 11A(1); Petroleum Act (NT), s 6(2); 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), s 28(1)(a); Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 
1990 (Vic), s 11(1); Mining Act 1971 (SA), s 18. 
58 Mining Act 1992 (NSW), s 73; Mineral Titles Act (NT), ss 40, 44; Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 234; Mining Act 
1971 (SA), s 39(a); Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 (Tas), s 84(1)(a); Mineral Resources (Sustainable 
Development) Act 1990 (Vic), ss 14, 42(4)(d); Mining Act 1978 (WA), s 85(1). 
Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 (NSW), s 41; Petroleum Act (NT), ss 55, 56; Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld), s 44(b); Petroleum 
and 
Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), ss 109, 112; Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (SA), s 34; 
Petroleum and 
Geothermal Energy Resources Act 1967 (WA), s 62. 
59 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), ss 235, 402; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), s 800. 
60 See Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), ch 6 pt 1; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), ch 2 pt 2. 
61 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 271; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), s 121. 
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environmental authority for coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities.
62
 A coal mining or coal 
seam gas extraction project will require federal environmental approval under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) if it is deemed to be a ‘controlled action’. 
‘Controlled actions’ are projects or activities that will have a significant impact on a matter of national 
environmental significance.
63
 The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) also establishes an Independent Expert Scientific Committee which will provide advice on the 
direct and cumulative impacts of coal seam gas development or large coal mining development upon 
water resources.
64
 This advice will be taken into account by the Minister when deciding whether to 
grant environmental approval.
65
 Other authorisations may also be necessary for particular projects, 
such as a water licence.   
Environmental impacts of the proposed activity must be considered as part of the decision-making 
process for the grant of a mining tenement in Queensland.
66
 However the main avenue for considering 
and addressing environmental impacts from coal mining and coal seam gas activities is the 
requirement for an environmental authority. The decision-maker must consider a variety of factors 
when deciding whether to grant the authority, including the application, any standard conditions for 
the relevant activity, and all submissions made regarding the application.
67
 The environmental impacts 
of the proposed activities are generally determined through an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA). 
EIA is a process for the examination and evaluation of environmental impacts, resulting in the 
production of an environmental impact statement used to inform the decision-maker.
68
 It does not 
determine the decision or bind the decision-maker to act in a particular way.
69
 An environmental 
impact statement will generally be required for coal mining and coal seam gas extraction activities in 
Queensland.
70
 A decision-maker will set out the requirements for an environmental impact 
statement,
71
 which must generally address the environmental impacts of the proposed activity, the 
proposed safeguards and mitigation measures for these impacts, and monitoring and management 
programs for the activity.
72
 Once completed and submitted, an environmental impact statement will be 
subject to a period of public consultation during which submissions may be made.
73
 The chief 
executive will then assess the final environmental impact statement and issue a report containing 
recommendations about the suitability of the project and conditions of approval that may be 
imposed.
74
 However the legislation does not bind the ultimate decision-maker granting the 
environmental authority to follow the recommendations about the suitability of the project or impose 
the recommended conditions of approval. 
 
                                                          
62 Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), s 391A; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), s 121(1)(f). 
63 See above n 44.  
64 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), pt 19 div 2B. 
65 Ibid ss 131AB, 136(2)(f)(a). 
66 In Queensland the decision-maker must take the environmental impacts of the mining activities into account when 
deciding whether to grant or refuse a mining tenement: Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), ss 271(2)(b) and 269(4)(j).  
67 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), s 176 and sch 4 definition of ‘standard criteria’.  
68 Gerald Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2010) 299-300. 
69 Douglas Fisher, Australian Environmental Law: Norms, Principles and Rules (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2010) 296. ‘An 
environmental impact statement is not a decision-making end in itself – it is a means to a decision-making end. Its purpose is 
to 
assist the decision-maker’: Prineas v Forestry Commission of NSW (1983) 49 LGRA 402 at 417 per Cripps J. 
70 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ch 3; ch 5 pt 3. 
71 Ibid s 46. 
72 Ibid s 41(2)(d); Environmental Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld) reg 6, sch 1. 
73 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ch 3 pt 1 div 4. 
74 Ibid ss 57-59. 
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Secondly, conditions of approval to address environmental impacts may be imposed upon 
environmental authorities. The decision-maker generally has a wide discretion to impose any 
conditions he or she considers necessary or desirable.
75
 These conditions can require the project 
proponent to take action to prevent environmental harm from the activities, rehabilitate or remediate 
environmental harm caused by the activities,
76
 or carry out the activities in a specified manner.
77
 An 
environmental offset condition requiring the project proponent to undertake works, or make a 
monetary payment to an environmental offset trust, may also be imposed where all cost-effective on-
site mitigation measures are already being taken.
78
 
Finally, there are specific duties to avoid or minimise environmental impacts or environmental harm 
contained in environmental protection legislation. A mining or petroleum tenement holder is generally 
required to rehabilitate the land after activities cease, and to take measures to avoid environmental 
damage or harm.
79
  
 
5.2.2 Environmental impacts from coal seam gas extraction – Queensland study 
 
Coal seam gas extraction results in unique environmental impacts such as impacts from hydraulic 
fracturing, groundwater impacts and large volumes of water extracted in the process (‘produced 
water’).80 High quality agricultural land may also be impacted by coal seam gas extraction activities. 
Regulatory frameworks must respond to these environmental impacts although the scope and severity 
of cumulative effects remain unknown. The Queensland regulatory framework is chosen for the case 
study due to the fact that coal seam gas extraction is taking place in Queensland and the legal regime 
has been the subject of in depth consideration over a number of years.  
Approvals 
Queensland’s regulatory framework requires a number of approvals to be obtained for a coal seam gas 
project. There are economic, social and environmental impacts arising from coal seam gas extraction 
including significant economic incentives to undertake coal seam gas extraction,
81
 the environmental 
impacts of the project on agricultural land and water resources, and the social impacts of the project 
upon individual landowners and the wider community. Current regulation goes some way towards 
integrating these considerations within the decision making process. A coal seam gas project will 
generally need to obtain approvals including a petroleum lease under the Petroleum and Gas (Safety 
and Production) Act 2004, an environmental authority under the Environmental Protection Act 1994, 
                                                          
75 Ibid s 203(1). 
76 Ibid s 207. 
77 Eg in Queensland, standard conditions specifying how the coal mining activities are to be carried out are imposed: Ibid ss 
318D and 707A; Environmental Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld), sch 3 pt 2 ‘Code of Environmental Compliance for 
Mining Lease Projects’. 
78 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ss 207, 209. 
79Ibid ss 264, 319, 437-440. 
  
80 See Susan Sakmar, ‘The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States be the next role model for the development of 
shale gas around the world?’ (2011) 33(2) Houston Journal of International Law 370 at 399-404. 
81 The Queensland Government states that ‘over $45 billion in committed and planned investment will generate new 
opportunities for businesses in countless industries across the state’ and ‘royalties from CSG-LNG operations are projected 
to increase from approximately $120 million in 2014–15 to $985 million in 2031–32 and will benefit all Queenslanders by 
helping to fund vital community infrastructure and services including roads, hospitals and schools’: Queensland 
Government, Opportunity Pipeline: Queensland’s gas success story (Queensland Government, 2011) 
<http://www.industry.qld.gov.au/lng/documents/CSG-Business-DERM-web.pdf>. 
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and an approval under the Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011. Federal environmental approval may 
also be required under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) 
where the project is likely to have impacts on a matter of national environmental significance.
82
 
Decisions to grant an environmental approval and an approval under the Strategic Cropping Land Act 
2011 will consider and address environmental impacts from coal seam gas extraction, including the 
imposition of conditions of approval for the carrying out of the project.  
Approvals under the Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 are specifically designed to protect land that 
is highly suitable for cropping and manage the impacts of development on that land.
83
 The Act divides 
impacts of development into ‘temporary impacts’ and ‘permanent impacts’ and provides for a 
simplified compliance framework for activities that have a ‘temporary impact’ upon the land.84 
Activities with a ‘temporary impact’ include common components of a coal seam gas project such as 
access tracks, underground pipes and coal seam gas wells.
85
 In cases where a coal seam gas project is 
not considered to have a ‘permanent impact’ upon strategic cropping land, a full development 
assessment will not be required under the Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011.
86
 This may result in a 
failure to thoroughly consider and address the environmental impacts of coal seam gas extraction on 
agricultural land.  
Ongoing management 
Once all of the necessary approvals have been granted for coal seam gas extraction, uncertainty 
surrounding the scope and severity of environmental impacts is likely to continue throughout the life 
of the project. The Queensland government is attempting to respond to this ongoing uncertainty by 
taking an ‘adaptive management’ approach to the regulation of environmental impacts.87An adaptive 
management approach is a system of ‘learning by doing’ and it has traditionally been applied to 
complex environmental problems where ecological uncertainty is present.
88
 Adaptive management is 
designed to assist regulators to learn about complex ecological systems by monitoring the results of a 
suite of management initiatives.
89
 It is not a decision-making framework
90
 but does have an important 
role to play in the decision framework.  
Adaptive management is an approach that ensures management not only plans and carries out actions 
to achieve objectives, but also measures the results so that it can be seen what is working and what is 
not, and consequently make informed decisions and adjustments to enhance the achievement of 
                                                          
82 See above n 44. The current Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment Bill 2013 seeks to create 
a new matter of national environmental significance for coal seam gas and large coal mining developments which are likely 
to have a significant impact on a water resource.  
83 Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 (Qld) s 3.  
84 Ibid s 81. 
85 Queensland Government, ‘Strategic Cropping Land Standard Conditions Code for Resource Activities’ (Department of 
Natural Resources and Mines, December 2012) at 3; Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 (Qld) s 81; Strategic Cropping Land 
Regulation 2011 (Qld), s 8. 
86 Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 (Qld) ss 77, 81, ch 3 pt 5. 
87 Queensland Government Business and Industry Portal, Environmental Assessments and Conditions (State of Queensland, 
5 April 2013) <http://www.business.qld.gov.au/industry/csg-lng-industry/water-environmental-management-
csg/environmental-assessments-conditions>; Queensland Government Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, 
Adaptive Management (State of Queensland, 1 April 2013) <http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/management/non-mining/adaptive-
management.html>. 
88 Robin Gregory, Daniel Ohlson and Joseph Arvai, ‘Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for applications to 
environmental management’ (2006) 16(6) Ecological Applications 2411, 2412-3. 
89 Ibid 2412. 
90 Robert Argent, ‘Components of Adaptive Management’ in Catherine Allan and George Stankey (eds), Adaptive 
Environmental Management (Springer, 2009) 26. 
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objectives and the delivery of desired outcomes.
91
 To be successful, the regulator must be able to 
process the necessary information and draw meaningful conclusions.
92
 It must be clear who decides 
how and when management practices will be changed, based on that evidence and why.
93
 
The Queensland regime describes itself as taking an ‘adaptive management’ approach to the 
regulation of coal seam gas extraction. The Government states that this approach will allow for: 
 the government to monitor the industry and instigate change where required; 
 the alteration of environmental conditions placed on a project on the basis of new 
information, monitoring or modelling which suggests the potential for unintended or 
unexpected impacts on the environment; and 
 best practice environmental management to be implemented as technologies develop over 
time.
94
   
This adaptive management approach is set out in various policy statements on Queensland 
government websites.
95
 However, implementation of a true adaptive management approach must go 
beyond policy statements. The adaptive management approach, particularly evaluation and learning 
processes, should be formally integrated into the legislative framework.
96
  
First, this requires the objectives and key desired outcomes of the adaptive management framework to 
be clearly specified in the relevant legislation,
97
 and the appropriate strategies and actions to be taken 
to achieve these objectives and key desired outcomes.
98
 
Secondly, formal requirements for evaluation and reporting on the effectiveness of the management 
approach should be included as part of the legislative framework.
99
 This will include setting out the 
range of potential performance indicators that can be used to monitor or measure the effectiveness of 
the management approach,
100
 such as the indicators for a change in management approach.  
Thirdly, legislation should also specify how the outcomes of learning and evaluation processes will be 
translated into action including: how findings of monitoring and evaluation will be reported in a 
transparent and credible manner;
101
 and who will be responsible for adjustments in the management 
approach in response to the results of evaluation.
102
 Overall there must be sufficient flexibility and 
responsiveness within the broader regulatory framework to allow the Government to alter its 
                                                          
91 Glenys Jones, ‘The Adaptive Management System for the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area: Linking 
management planning with effectiveness evaluation’ in Catherine Allan and George Stankey (eds), Adaptive Environmental 
Management (Springer, 2009) 228. 
92 Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘Requirements for Adaptive Water Management’ in Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Pavel Kabat and Jorn 
Moltgen (eds), Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with complexity and uncertainty (Springer, 2007) 4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Queensland Government Business and Industry Portal, Environmental Assessments and Conditions, above n 87; 
Queensland Government Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Adaptive Management, above n 87. 
95 Ibid. See also former Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management statement: Queensland 
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98 Ibid 237. 
99 Ibid 256. 
100 Ibid 239. 
101 Ibid 240. 
102 Ibid.  
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regulatory approach in response to the information and conclusions established through the adaptive 
management approach.
103
 
The cornerstone of an adaptive management regime is the ability of regulators to respond to new 
information and data and adjust the regime accordingly. Currently, Queensland legislation sets out a 
number of obligations aimed at addressing the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing, 
groundwater impacts, and produced water impacts. There is some provision for adjustment of the 
regime in accordance with new information on environmental impacts. The relevant legislative 
provisions are set out below.   
Hydraulic fracturing 
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to extract coal seam gas through stimulating the well by 
pumping a fluid (comprised of water, sand and chemical lubricants) under pressure to open up cracks 
and fracture the coal seam to increase gas production.
104
 Concerns surrounding hydraulic fracking 
include the use of chemical additives in the fracking fluid and the potential for impacts on the 
structural integrity of underground aquifers.
105
 In response to this, legislative restrictions on the use of 
certain chemical additives in fracking fluids have been introduced.
106
   
 A number of reporting and notification requirements for the carrying out of hydraulic fracturing are 
placed upon tenement holders. These are mainly obligations to provide the regulator and/or landowner 
with details of fracking activities,
107
 to report well head leaks
108
 and other prescribed ‘incidents’109, 
and to notify the regulator of any environmental harm or damage to aquifers caused by fracking.
110
 
There are penalties for a failure to notify as required under the legislation.
111
 There are other general 
legislative provisions setting out consequences upon notification of environmental harm. An 
environmental report about the activity causing the harm may be required under the Environmental 
Protection Act 1994.
112
 The regulator may then exercise general powers to impose a transitional 
environmental program, amend the conditions of the environmental authority, serve an environmental 
protection order on the project proponent or take any other action it considers appropriate.
113
 The 
general terms of the legislation provide scope for adjustment of the conditions applying to coal seam 
gas extraction in response to environmental harm. Hydraulic fracturing could conceivably cause 
‘environmental harm’ as defined by the Environmental Protection Act 1994.114 However, there are no 
specific legislative provisions for regulatory responses to new information regarding the 
environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Regulatory responses could include requiring further 
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safeguards for hydraulic fracturing or requiring the project proponent to cease hydraulic fracturing 
altogether. 
Groundwater impacts 
Coal seam gas extraction may result in significant impacts on aquifer interaction including water flow 
and cross contamination, and interference with structural integrity and artesian pressure.
115
 The 
cumulative impacts of multiple coal seam gas projects in the Surat and Bowen basins on groundwater 
are unknown.
116
 An adaptive management approach to this issue would require regulatory powers to 
adjust the management regime in response to new information about direct and/or cumulative 
environmental impacts upon groundwater resources. Ideally, a regional scale, multi-state and multi-
layer groundwater flow model of the cumulative effects of multiple developments should be used to 
set the parameters for an adaptive management framework.
117
 In the meantime, a precautionary 
approach to approval of projects is recommended.
118
  
The Queensland approach to groundwater regulation purports to apply the principles of adaptive 
management through a combination of monitoring, assessment, reporting and management of 
impacts. The Water Act 2000 (Qld) requires tenement holders to use all best efforts to acquire all 
information regarding relevant water bores in the tenement area,
119
 and prepare a baseline assessment 
plan for all identified water bores before commencing operations.
120
 The tenement holder must 
prepare an underground water impact report containing measures for an ongoing water monitoring 
strategy to be approved by the Queensland Water Corporation.
121
 This report must be supplied within 
14 months of the grant of tenure and every three years thereafter.
 122
 Where there are multiple tenure 
holders in one area, this will be a declared cumulative management area and Queensland Water 
Corporation will be responsible for monitoring and reporting of groundwater impacts in the area.
123
  
Additionally, the Water Act 2000 (Qld) contains trigger thresholds for the impacts of coal seam gas 
activities on groundwater drawdown in bores and springs. Once triggered, a tenement holder may be 
required to undertake a bore assessment.
124
 If the assessment reveals that the water bore has an 
impaired capacity and it is established that the activities contributed to a material impact on the bore 
water supply, the tenement holder must negotiate ‘make good’ arrangements with the bore owner.125 
These arrangements may include restoration of water supply, providing an alternate water supply or 
compensation to the bore owner for loss of water supply.
126
 The tenement holder and bore owner will 
enter into a ‘make good agreement’ which will be binding upon both parties and all future successors 
in title.
127
  
Queensland regulation of groundwater impacts from coal seam gas projects is not consistent with an 
adaptive management approach. The legislation imposes requirements to collect data and provide 
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reports on underground water impacts, but it is not clear how the Government will determine whether, 
and to what extent, the existing regulatory approach requires adjustment in response to this 
information.
128
 The Environmental Protection Act 1994 provides that an environmental authority may 
be amended where it is necessary or desirable because an underground water impact report identifies 
impacts, or potential impacts, on an environmental value.
129
 However specific provisions setting out 
thresholds for amendment of an environmental authority, and the manner in which it may be 
amended, are lacking.  
‘Make good’ arrangements are also unlikely to adequately protect against long term impacts on 
underground water resources.
130
 The current approach leaves the obligation to require specific 
remediation of groundwater impacts in the hands of the landowners rather than the hands of the 
regulators, who will have the cumulative data and knowledge of the QWC. The Government will not 
be responsible for directing the tenement holder to take steps to ‘make good’ any damage to water 
bores, and the option to provide compensation to landowners means that the water supply could 
remain permanently affected. Furthermore, the use of ‘make good’ obligations appears to assume that 
the majority of groundwater impacts will be able to be mitigated or reversed. Contamination of water 
supply or joining of aquifers is not generally a reversible event, which could lead to permanent 
deprivation of water supply for particular areas of land. Failure to take measures to properly regulate 
this risk of serious or irreversible environmental harm may constitute a breach of the precautionary 
principle of ESD.  
Overall, further legislative reforms are necessary in order for the Government to respond to emerging 
information regarding the groundwater impacts of coal seam gas extraction. This would include 
regulatory powers to suspend or cease coal seam gas extraction upon new information or data 
demonstrating an unacceptably high risk to groundwater resources.  
Produced water  
Coal seam gas development produces large volumes of poor quality co-produced water which must be 
managed to avoid damage to soil, vegetation and surrounding water resources.
131
 Options for disposal 
of produced water include re-injection to underground formations, direct discharge to the surface, 
impoundment in an evaporation pond or treatment and beneficial use of the water.
132
 The 
government’s preferred disposal option is re-injection or treatment and use of the produced water, 
while the use of an evaporation pond is prohibited unless there is no feasible alternative.
133
 There are 
several forms of approval that may be required under the Environmental Protection Act 1994, Water 
Act 2000 and/or the Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 for the treatment, use and 
                                                          
128 However the Water Act 2000 does allow the chief executive to direct the petroleum tenement holder to propose an 
amendment to the underground water report if there has been a material change in the information or a prediction contained 
in an approved underground water impact report or final report: s 392.  
129 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 215(2)(m); Environmental Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld) s 24AB. The 
report must be approved under s 385 of the Water Act 2000. An ‘environmental value’ is: (a) a quality or physical 
characteristic of the environment that is conducive to ecological health or public amenity or safety; or (b) another quality of 
the environment identified and declared to be an environmental value under an environmental protection policy or 
regulation: Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 9. 
130 National Water Commission, Position Statement: Coal Seam Gas and Water (December 2010, Australian Government) 
3.  
131 See National Water Commission and RPS Australia East Pty Ltd, Onshore Co-produced Water: Extent and Management 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 1; Mauricio Taulis, ‘Australia and New Zealand CBNG development and 
environmental implications’ in KJ Reddy (ed), Coalbed Natural Gas: Energy and Environment (Nova Science Publishers, 
2010) 415, 421. 
132 National Water Commission and RPS Australia East Pty Ltd, Onshore Co-produced Water: Extent and Management, 
above n 131, viii, 18.  
133 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 310D. 
30 
 
supply of produced water. Once approval is granted, there is little legislative scope for adjustment of 
the regulatory approach to management of produced water in Queensland.   
5.2.3  Conclusions 
Queensland legislation does not exhibit all the necessary features of an adaptive management 
environmental approach. The regulatory framework for coal seam gas is ultimately designed to allow 
projects to proceed subject to monitoring, reporting and adjustment of industry practices as new 
information emerges. Responsibilities placed upon tenement holders are generally limited to reporting 
and notification requirements, with the exception of ‘make good’ obligations. Principles of adaptive 
management are not fully integrated into the statutory provisions. Once approvals for a coal seam gas 
project have been granted under the Environmental Protection Act 1994, Water Act 2000 and the 
Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004, there are minimal powers for adjustment of the 
management regime applying to the project. These Acts contain very little scope for amendment of 
the conditions of a petroleum tenement, water licence or environmental authority in response to 
emerging information about environmental impacts.
134
 One notable exception is the power to amend 
an environmental authority where it is necessary or desirable because of environmental impacts 
identified in an underground water impact report, or another relevant report accepted by the chief 
executive.
135
 There is also limited scope for cancellation of an environmental authority or petroleum 
tenement.
136
 Implementation of a true adaptive management approach would require legislation 
allowing for cancellation of an authority or tenement in response to emerging information that shows 
unacceptably high risks of environmental harm. It would also require legislative provisions conferring 
a range of other regulatory powers in response to emerging information on environmental impacts, 
including clear indicators and thresholds for application of these powers.  
Even if Queensland’s statutory framework were to properly implement an adaptive management 
approach, there are several issues which arise from using this approach to regulate the environmental 
impacts of coal seam gas extraction. An adaptive management approach may conflict with the 
precautionary principle of ESD. This principle of ESD requires that where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
137
 Coal seam gas development poses a 
potentially serious and irreversible threat to groundwater resources.
138
 Application of the 
precautionary principle would require measures to prevent this damage, which may only be possible 
through a moratorium on coal seam gas extraction until further scientific information is available.  
Adaptive management requires a degree of risk taking, as policies are implemented as experiments 
with uncertain outcomes. However it may be impossible to know which policy or management option 
will attain the desired goal in the face of great uncertainty about the dynamics of the system under 
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management.
139 
There is a significant degree of uncertainty surrounding the long-term cumulative 
impacts of coal seam gas extraction on groundwater resources.
140
 This will increase the difficulty of 
applying an adaptive management approach to regulate these impacts.  
A true adaptive management approach is likely to include regulatory powers to cancel or suspend a 
petroleum tenement where new information shows that the risk of environmental harm has become 
unacceptably high. The impacts of legislating for a power to cancel or suspend a petroleum tenement 
on these grounds must be considered. A petroleum tenement is a form of property and although there 
are no rights to compensation for acquisition of property under Queensland legislation,
141
 cancellation 
of a petroleum tenement is likely to have severe economic and social impacts upon the tenement 
holder.  
  
5.3  Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Extraction Activities 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions are a significant environmental impact resulting from the extraction of 
carbon. Coal mining and coal seam gas extraction produce substantial amounts of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Regulatory action for the reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from coal 
mining activities and coal seam gas extraction is necessary to meet Australia’s commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and to implement the principles of ecologically sustainable development. 
There are several legal instruments that could be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from coal 
mining and coal seam gas extraction, although currently there is no specific requirement to consider 
greenhouse gas emissions as part of the approval process in Queensland.  
5.3.1. EIA process 
First, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process for the grant of an environmental authority 
could be used as the first step in regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The EIA process has been 
previously outlined. In Queensland, EIA is mandatory for large-scale coal mining and coal seam gas 
extraction projects.
142
 The federal Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) (EPBCA) also requires an EIA process to be undertaken for projects that will have a significant 
impact on a matter of national environmental significance.
143
 The difficulty in establishing the 
necessary causal link between greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining activities and a “significant 
impact on a matter of national environmental significance” means that the EPBCA is not usually 
applied.
144
 Where the proposed activity requires approval under both the EPBCA and Queensland 
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legislation, the Queensland EIA process may be accredited, rendering the Commonwealth EIA 
process unnecessary.
145
  
Queensland EIA provisions, including the nature, purpose and scope of the legislation and the 
potential content of an environmental impact statement, are broadly stated.
146
 The provisions of the 
Queensland legislation are capable of operating to require information about the environmental 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from proposed coal mining or coal seam gas extraction 
activities, but this does not always occur in practice.
147
 Queensland policy documents specifically 
require an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions and proposals for greenhouse gas abatement 
measures as part of an environmental impact statement,
148
 but there is no legislative requirement for 
consideration of the environmental impacts from greenhouse gas emissions as part of the EIA.  
5.3.2.  Approval stage 
Greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction could be considered and 
addressed during the decision-making process for the grant of: (i) an environmental authority; or (ii) a 
mining or petroleum tenement.  
First, there is scope for consideration of environmental impacts from greenhouse gas emissions during 
the decision-making process for grant of an environmental authority. In Queensland, decision-makers 
are required to consider ‘standard criteria’ when making the decision to grant an environmental 
authority.
149
 These criteria include the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, and 
conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity.
150
 Environmental impacts of greenhouse 
gas emissions, specifically climate change, are likely to cause serious and irreversible harm, affect 
future generations and adversely affect biological diversity and ecological integrity. Therefore, 
consideration of the standard criteria would arguably encompass consideration of the environmental 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. This may not always occur in practice. A significant obstacle 
evident from a number of judicial review decisions concerning authorisations for coal mining 
activities is the establishment of a causal link between the activities, climate change and 
environmental impacts. It has proven extremely difficult to demonstrate a causal link between 
greenhouse gas emissions from particular coal mining activities and environmental impacts.
151
 Even 
where a causal link is found, consideration of environmental impacts caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions is only one factor which the decision-maker must take into account along with social and 
economic considerations. In light of the strong political, economic and social drivers for coal mining 
and coal seam gas extraction in Queensland, environmental impacts caused by greenhouse gas 
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emissions may be relegated to a subsidiary consideration.
152
 Additionally, there is limited availability 
for review of decisions to approve coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities.  
Secondly, there may also be scope for consideration of environmental impacts from greenhouse gas 
emissions in the decision-making process for the grant of a mining tenement. Queensland legislation 
requires consideration of adverse environmental impacts as part of the decision-making process for 
grant of a mining tenement.
153
 The legislation is terse and its application in practice amounts to little 
more than an acknowledgement of environmental impacts and referral to the existence of an 
environmental authority.
154
  
A failure to consider the environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining or coal 
seam gas extraction as part of the decision-making process for the grant of approvals may breach the 
principle of ESD that economic, social and environmental considerations should be integrated into the 
decision-making process. Specific legislative duties for decision-makers to consider environmental 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining and coal seam gas extraction may be necessary 
to redress this. 
 
5.3.3.  Conditions of approval 
Thirdly, once approval has been granted for coal mining or coal seam gas extraction, the imposition of 
conditions of approval upon mining or petroleum tenements and environmental authorities could be 
used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. These conditions should be cost-effective and 
proportionate to the environmental issue being addressed, in accordance with the principles of ESD.
155
 
It appears that current legislation
156
 will authorise the imposition of conditions of approval for the 
reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions upon an environmental authority or mining or 
petroleum tenement.
157 
However conditions of approval requiring reduction or mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions are seldom imposed in practice. This may be due to difficulties in 
demonstrating a causal link between greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas 
extraction and environmental impacts. 
Specific legislative requirements for imposition of conditions for the reduction or mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions may be necessary to facilitate compliance with Australia’s international 
obligations. Obligations to reduce or mitigate greenhouse gas emissions may be imposed upon a 
tenement holder in several forms, including requirements to take measures to minimise emissions at 
their source or mitigate emissions through the purchase of carbon offset credits such as those 
generated under the Carbon Farming Initiative. Imposition of such conditions may be challenging in 
practice due to the lack of technology to quantitatively measure greenhouse gas emissions from coal 
mining and coal seam gas extraction. There is also an unsatisfactory level of uncertainty surrounding 
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the development of the market for offset credits under the Carbon Farming Initiative. It is unlikely 
that a condition requiring these types of offsets will be imposed.
158
 However, it is important to note 
that emissions from coal mining and coal seam gas extraction are likely to be regulated under the 
carbon pricing mechanism. Any conditions of approval for the mitigation or reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions should work together with the carbon pricing mechanism and avoid the imposition of 
‘double liability’.  
In conclusion, environmental protection legislation could be applied to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from coal mining and coal seam gas extraction. The Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld) contains provisions that prohibit actions causing environmental harm, and restrict activities 
causing pollution and waste.
159
 The relevant provisions are phrased in wide terms and could 
theoretically extend to regulate greenhouse gas emissions caused by coal mining and coal seam gas 
extraction in the following manner: 
(a) The act of causing environmental harm through greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining 
or coal seam gas extraction activities could be an offence; and/or 
(b) Greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities could be 
regulated as pollution, contamination or waste, and restrictions placed on their emission.  
In practice, environmental protection legislation is not applied to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions.
160
 It appears that legislative amendments will be required in order to achieve this, such as 
specifically listing greenhouse gas emissions as a ‘prescribed contaminant’ in Queensland 
legislation.
161
 
Overall, legal instruments that could be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining 
and coal seam gas extraction are not applied in this manner. The result is that environmental impacts 
from greenhouse gas emissions are neither considered or addressed during the approval process, nor 
regulated throughout the life of a coal mining or coal seam gas extraction project.   
 
5.4   Managing Access to Private Land for Extraction Activities  
Access to private land for coal seam gas extraction projects has recently proven to be a contentious 
issue in Queensland and New South Wales. Impacts from these projects on landowners include 
disruption of land-use practices, surface impacts (including subsidence), air, water and soil 
contamination, and other social and economic impacts.
162
 Regulation of access to private land must 
balance environmental, economic and social considerations in order to ensure ecologically sustainable 
development.   
Queensland’s legal regime provides an instructive model for the management of land access for 
extraction activities. The regime is based upon a statutory process for entry upon private land which a 
tenement holder must comply with. Mandatory best practice guidelines for good relations between 
tenement holders and private landowners are also outlined in the Land Access Code.
163
 Queensland’s 
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land access framework is substantially identical for all major resources projects including mining, 
petroleum, geothermal and greenhouse gas storage.
164
 
The holder of a petroleum tenement will have rights to access private land comprised in the tenement 
and to carry out authorised activities on the land. These rights are subject to compliance with the 
statutory process for land access and the Land Access Code. Tenement holders may also use other 
mechanisms to gain land access for a resource development project. For example, an easement over 
the land or Ministerial permission to enter land may be obtained instead of, or in conjunction with, the 
statutory land access framework.
165
 
5.4.1 The Land Access Code 
 
The Land Access Code was introduced to address environmental and social impacts of extraction 
activities upon private landowners, and applies to all resource development projects in Queensland. It 
comprises best practice guidelines for landholders and companies about how to manage processes 
related to consultation and compensation, and sets out mandatory conditions of conduct that 
companies must comply with when undertaking authorised activities on private land. These conditions 
will form mandatory conditions of a petroleum authority under the Petroleum and Gas (Production 
and Safety) Act 2004.
166
 Tenement holders are obliged to comply with the mandatory conditions of 
conduct
167
 and cannot contract out of them.
168
  
5.4.2 The statutory process for land access 
A petroleum tenement holder has rights to access land inside the tenement.
169
 The tenement holder 
must provide a minimum of ten days notice to a private landowner before entering onto the land 
inside the tenement to carry out authorised activities.
170
 Additionally, the tenement holder must enter 
into a conduct and compensation agreement with the landowner before ‘advanced activities’171 can be 
carried out on the land.
172
 Conduct and compensation agreements must address entry to the land, 
carrying out of authorised activities, and compensation payable by the tenement holder to the 
landowner.
173
 The general principle is that compensation must cover any loss or damage caused by 
coal seam gas extraction activities, including deprivation of possession, reduction in land value or use, 
severance from the land and consequential damages.
174
 The Petroleum and Gas (Safety and 
Production) Act 2004 (Qld) also confers ‘access rights’ on a petroleum tenement holder to cross land 
outside of the petroleum tenement where it is reasonably necessary to enter the area of the tenement 
and to carry out activities on the land that are reasonably necessary to allow the crossing of the 
                                                          
164 See Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) sch 1; Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld) ch 6, pt 5; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2009 (Qld) ch 5, pt 7; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ch 5 pts 2, 5.  
165 See Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 399, 437A, 506(4). Ministerial permission may only 
be obtained for land over which a pipeline licence is held and only in certain circumstances: Petroleum and Gas (Production 
and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ch 4 pt 5.  
166 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Regulation 2004 (Qld) sch 1A. 
167 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 555.  
168 Ibid s 533(2). 
169 Although the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) does not specifically confer this right, it 
presumes that the right exists, and imposes requirements that a tenement holder must meet before they can exercise it.  
170 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 495-499. 
171 ‘Advanced activities’ are authorised activities that will have a more than a minor impact on the business or land use 
activities of any owner or occupier of the land on which the activity is to be carried out: Ibid Petroleum and Gas (Production 
and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2 Dictionary. 
172 Ibid ss 500, 532. ‘Landowner’ includes both owners and occupiers of the land: Petroleum and Gas (Safety and 
Production) Act 2004 (Qld) s 532.  
173 Ibid s 533(1). 
174 Ibid s 532. 
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land.
175
 Before entry onto the land, the tenement holder must enter into an access agreement with the 
landowner for the exercise of the access rights, and also a conduct and compensation agreement.
176
   
Both access agreements and conduct and compensation agreements are fundamentally a contract 
between two private parties. However the legislation provides that both types of agreement will be 
enforceable against the parties and their ‘successors and assigns’,177 giving the agreements an 
extended effect that is functionally similar to a property right. ‘Successors and assigns’ will include a 
party who purchases the land from the original landowner or is assigned the lease from the original 
lessee of the land. The Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) also states that the interest of a petroleum tenement 
holder under an access agreement is an exception to a registered landowner’s indefeasible title.178 
Conduct and compensation agreements are not mentioned. 
A registered owner of land will hold their land subject to any interests that are recorded on the State 
land title register for that parcel of land. Otherwise, they have full ownership of the land unaffected by 
any claims to it. This is known as ‘indefeasible title’ or the ‘benefits’ or ‘protection’ of indefeasibility. 
However, State legislation sets out a list of exceptions to this. A registered owner will hold their 
indefeasible title subject to any exceptions that exist, even if the exception is not recorded on the land 
title register. In Queensland, a registered landowner will hold their land subject to exceptions 
including the interest of a petroleum tenement holder under an access agreement. 
Several issues arise from the current statutory framework for land access. Legislation stating that 
access agreements and conduct and compensation agreements are enforceable against successive 
landowners is contrary to established rules of property law. First, it is likely to conflict with the legal 
rules for covenants running with the land.
179
 Secondly, a conduct and compensation agreement is not 
stated to be an exception to indefeasibility under the Land Title Act 1994. Therefore, making a 
conduct and compensation agreement enforceable against successive landowners may be inconsistent 
with the established principle of indefeasible title. The interaction of the statutory provisions is 
unclear and little judicial guidance is available at this early stage.
180
  
The scope of a petroleum tenement holder’s ‘interest’ under an access agreement, which gains the 
protection of indefeasibility, is also unclear. Any successive landowner will need to assess which 
terms are within the statutory scope of an ‘access agreement’ and therefore enforceable against them. 
This will create uncertainty and transaction costs. The lack of clarity surrounding enforceability of 
these agreements against third parties is compounded by the following: 
(a) agreements are not noted on the land title register (although the Queensland Government is 
currently progressing legislative amendments to require this); and 
(b) agreements are generally expressed to be confidential. 
Finally, it is unclear which classes of third parties an access agreement or conduct and compensation 
agreement will be enforceable against. These issues should be rectified in order to provide secure land 
access for the duration of the project, clarify the long-term rights and obligations of tenement holders 
and landowners, and minimise uncertainty and transaction costs for third parties such as successive 
landowners.  
                                                          
175 Ibid s 502. 
176 Ibid ss 503, 532 (1). 
177 Ibid ss 507, 537E.  
178 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1)(h). 
179 See further Adrian Bradbrook and Susan MacCallum, Bradbrook and Neave’s Easements and Restrictive Covenants 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2011) chs 12, 13, 14, 17.  
180 See Cape Flattery Silica Mines Pty Ltd v Hope Vale Aboriginal Shire Council [2012] QSC 381. 
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It is noted that other issues may arise from the current land access framework such as the proper scope 
of compensation payable to landowners. These issues are beyond the scope of this report and are 
currently under review by the Queensland Government.
181
  
 
5.5. Conclusions and Recommendations for Reform 
 
The current legal regime addresses the environmental and social impacts of coal mining and coal 
seam gas extraction to some extent. Regulation to address the environmental impacts of coal seam gas 
extraction and the social impacts of access to private land is particularly advanced in Queensland. 
There are a number of reforms which could be implemented to further integrate environmental, social 
and economic considerations into the regulatory framework, assisting in the achievement of ESD.  
5.5.1  Regulation of environmental impacts  
Reform of the Queensland regime to integrate an adaptive management approach into the legislative 
framework requires the following elements: 
 the inclusion of clear objectives, performance indicators and criteria for evaluation or response in 
the statutory provisions; 
 the creation of an appropriate decision-making  framework against which the current regulatory 
approach could be tested and amended; and 
 design of the statutory regime with sufficient flexibility to enable changes to be made to the 
regulatory framework in response to improved knowledge and understanding of environmental 
impacts. 
In particular this would require specific legislative provisions including: 
 provisions in the Environmental Protection Act 1994, Water Act 2000 and/or the Petroleum and 
Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 allowing for the amendment of conditions of approval in 
response to new information about the environmental impacts of a particular project, or coal seam 
gas extraction in general 
 a range of regulatory powers to respond to reports of well leaks or environmental harm caused by 
hydraulic fracturing 
 a range of regulatory powers to respond to any new information contained in underground water 
impact reports regarding adverse environmental impacts  
 granting power to regulators to ultimately decide to cease coal seam gas activities in the face of 
significant information gaps and/or an unacceptably high risk of cumulative adverse impacts 
Additionally, the Government should not leave negotiations about a tenement holder’s obligation to 
address impacts on groundwater resources to the owners of water bores. These impacts should be 
addressed through legislative powers to respond to new information and adjust the terms of the water 
licence or environmental authority as required.  
 
                                                          
181 See David Watson et al, Land Access Framework — 12-month Review: Report of the land access review panel 
(Queensland Government, 2012); Queensland Government Response to the Report of the Land Access Review Panel 
(Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, 2012).  
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5.5.2  Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions  
There are a number of current legal instruments that could be applied to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction. This seldom occurs in practice and 
legislative reform may be necessary to specifically require greenhouse gas emissions to be considered 
and addressed.  
 Specific legislative duties should be placed upon decision-makers to require information on the 
environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions as part of the EIA process. 
 Specific legislative duties should be placed upon a decision-maker to consider any environmental 
impacts caused by greenhouse gas emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction when 
making the decision to grant an environmental or planning authorisation and a mining or 
petroleum tenement. 
 Environmental impacts caused by greenhouse gas emissions could form part of a mandated 
hierarchy of considerations in the decision-making process; for example, by framing them as a 
‘cardinal principle’ which ranks higher than social and economic considerations. 
 Merits review of decisions to approve coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities could be 
made available in all Australian jurisdictions. 
 Conditions for the reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions should be imposed upon 
approvals for coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities. 
Although the carbon pricing mechanism may place liability upon tenement holders for fugitive 
emissions from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction,
182
 the abovementioned reforms are still 
necessary. A range of legal instruments is required to effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from coal mining or coal seam gas extraction activities, instead of dependence on a single mechanism. 
The carbon pricing mechanism does not affect the decision-making process to grant approval for coal 
mining or coal seam gas extraction or the conditions of approval which can be imposed. Furthermore, 
the future of the carbon pricing mechanism after the 2013 federal election is uncertain. 
 5.5.3 Regulation of access to private land 
Access to private land for extraction activities results in economic, environmental and social impacts 
upon private landowners and third parties. Land access should be regulated in a clear and transparent 
manner to minimise economic, social and environmental impacts on landowners to the greatest extent 
possible. The following reforms are recommended:  
 The source of the tenement holder’s right to access land inside of the petroleum tenement should 
be clarified in the Petroleum and Gas (Safety and Production) Act 2004 
The enforceability of an access agreement and a conduct and compensation agreement against 
successive registered landowners, lessees and mortgagees should be clarified. This should include 
clarification of which types of terms in these agreements are enforceable against third parties (eg 
compensation clauses, access clauses, personal obligations).  
 Sections 184 and 185 of the Land Title Act should be amended to: (i) clarify whether a conduct 
and compensation agreement is an ‘interest’ under these sections; (ii) define the scope of a 
petroleum tenement holder’s ‘interest’ under an access agreement. 
                                                          
182 This is subject to a tenement holder meeting the pre-requisites for imposition of liability under the Clean Energy Act 2011 
(Cth) such as emitting 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide annually: see Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20-22. 
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 Disclosure of the existence and contents of an access agreement or conduct and compensation 
agreement is recommended. The existence of either agreement should be noted on the land title 
register or another publicly searchable register such as the administrative advices register, and 
disclosure of the contents of either agreement should be required upon request of a prospective 
purchaser, lessee or mortgagee of the land. 
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6. Legislative Case Study Two – Coal Fired Electricity Generation 
 
6.1 Overview Case Study Two
183
 
 
Carbon products are transformed through the burning of coal to produce electricity. Coal-fired 
electricity generation is a major source of emissions in Australia. The electricity generation sector is 
responsible for over one third of Australia’s emissions, and coal-fired electricity comprises over 75% 
of electricity produced.
184
 Therefore, effective reduction of emissions from coal-fired electricity 
generation will play a significant role in meeting Australia’s international and domestic target of 
reducing national emissions by five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020. This case study will analyse 
the Australian legal framework at Commonwealth and State level used to regulate emissions from 
coal-fired electricity generation. The primary legal instrument for regulation of emissions from coal-
fired electricity generation is the carbon pricing mechanism (CPM). While there are other legal 
instruments that could be used to complement the CPM, such as environmental and planning approval 
process, conditions of environmental or planning approval, energy efficiency measures and the large-
scale renewable energy target, the case study demonstrates that the effectiveness of the CPM is 
hampered by inconsistent application of these mechanisms by State governments and the significant 
exceptions to the application of the CPM..   
 
This case study will examine the regulatory framework at the national and state level for reducing 
emission from coal fired power stations and whether the legislative framework presents an integrated 
model for the reduction of emissions in this sector. The principles of ESD will be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the framework, in particular: 
(i) whether the legislative framework implementing the CPM, including assistance packages 
to the sector, appropriately balances environmental considerations with economic and 
social issues; 
(ii) the continuing need for any approvals related to coal fired power stations to include 
conditions or targets for the lowering of GHG emissions; 
(iii) the need for a coherent legal framework that manages reduction of emissions through a 
combination of incentives to reduce emission and penalties for failure to meet targets 
 
6.2 National Framework - Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
 
The carbon pricing mechanism commenced on 1 July 2012. It is implemented through the Clean 
Energy Act 2011 (Cth) and associated legislation. The Act’s objects are to take flexible and cost-
                                                          
183 Material in this case study was originally published in the following sources and reproduced with the permission of the 
publisher: Sharon Christensen, W D Duncan and Angela Phillips, ‘Regulation of Emissions under the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism: A case study of Australia’s coal-fired electricity sector’ (2013) 15 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law 
17; Nicola Swayne, ‘The Legal Framework for Australia's Carbon Pricing Mechanism: A critique’  (2011) 5 Environmental 
Liability 156. 
184 The electricity generation sector accounted for 35 per cent of Australia’s national emissions in the year to December 
2012: Commonwealth Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, 
Australian National Greenhouse Accounts: Quarterly update of Australia’s national greenhouse gas inventory, December 
quarter 2012 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), 6 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/sites/climatechange/files/documents/05_2013/NGGI-Quartery-Dec-2012.pdf>. See also 
Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, Energy in Australia 2012 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), 3 
<http://www.bree.gov.au/ documents/publications/energy-in-aust/energy-in-australia-2012.pdf>.   
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effective action towards reducing Australia’s emissions by 80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050, 
and to price carbon in a way that encourages investment in clean energy, supports jobs and 
competitiveness in the economy, and supports Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution.  
The carbon pricing mechanism was enacted in a highly sensitive political environment, which is 
reflected in the Act’s attempts to strike a delicate balance between environmental, economic and 
social priorities.
185
 From an environmental perspective, the carbon pricing mechanism is principally 
aimed at reducing emissions. However, Australia’s economy is reliant upon emissions-intensive 
industries.
186
 The introduction of a carbon price without transitional assistance to ensure job security, 
competitiveness and economic growth would have been detrimental from an economic and social 
standpoint. Transitional assistance is provided under the carbon pricing mechanism to emissions-
intensive, trade-exposed industries and coal-fired electricity generators.
187
 
 
The aim of introducing a carbon price is to make emissions-intensive goods and services more 
expensive,
188
 but also to make goods and services produced with low-emissions energy or technology 
relatively cheaper. A consequent change in behaviour should occur by lowering consumer demand for 
expensive, emissions-intensive goods and services, and encouraging investment in low-emissions 
energy and technology, eventually leading to reduction of Australia’s emissions.  
 
 6.2.1 Operation of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
 
The carbon pricing mechanism is comprised of a carbon tax
189
 until 1 July 2015 and a cap-and-trade 
emissions trading scheme thereafter. The basic principle of the mechanism is that a ‘liable entity’ 
must purchase and then surrender an emissions unit for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted.
190
 If a 
liable entity
191
 does not surrender enough emissions units to cover its emissions, it must pay a 
penalty.
192
 Eligible emissions units include carbon units that are sold by the federal Government 
through the Clean Energy Regulator.   
 
The price of carbon units is fixed until 1 July 2015. A liable entity must purchase carbon units which 
will automatically be surrendered back to the Government. Effectively this creates a carbon tax by 
                                                          
185 This reflects the principle of ecologically sustainable development, which requires that economic and environmental 
considerations are effectively integrated into decision-making processes:  
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, above n 35, pt 1; Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment, above n 35, s 3.2. 
186 Such as steel, aluminium, cement and zinc manufacturing, coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation. See also The 
Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final report, above n 12, ch 8.   
187 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pt 7 (Jobs and Competitiveness Program), pt 8 (Coal-Fired Electricity Generation). 
188 Richard Webb, ‘Securing a Clean Energy Future: Some Economic Aspects’ (Research Paper No 5, Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 2011–12) 8.   
189  The authors acknowledge that the use of the phrase ‘carbon tax’ to describe the fixed charge years of the carbon 
pricing mechanism is controversial. However, we are speaking in general terms, and do not purport to classify it as a tax for 
constitutional or taxation law purposes. It has been acknowledged that the operation of the carbon pricing mechanism in 
fixed charge years is similar to a tax: International Emissions Trading Association, Greenhouse Gas Market 2011: Asia and 
Beyond: The Roadmap to Global Carbon and Energy Markets (2011), 3 
<http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=419:ghg-market-report-
2011&catid=26:reports&Itemid=93>. 
190  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 121–134. 
191 A liable entity is an entity in operational control of a facility such as a coal-fired electricity generation complex. The 
facility must emit 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide annually. Therefore, a person who has operational control of a 
coal-fired generation complex with covered emissions of 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide annually will be a liable 
entity: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20-22. 
192  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 125, 128, 133.  
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requiring liable entities to pay a fixed price for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted from 1 July 2012 
until 30 June 2015.  
 
From 1 July 2015, a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme will commence. The Government will 
put a carbon pollution cap in place. The cap is the maximum number of carbon units that the 
Government can issue, through either auction or free allocation, for each year.
193
 The price of carbon 
units will not be fixed and will be the market price at which they are auctioned. A liable entity can 
purchase carbon units at an auction
194
 and either voluntarily surrender or trade them. Each year, liable 
entities must surrender enough emissions units to cover their annual emissions. The emissions trading 
scheme will theoretically encourage liable entities to invest in the most cost-effective ways to reduce 
emissions, by either introducing methods to reduce their emissions or acquiring emissions units from 
another liable entity.
195
   
 
There are three types of eligible emissions units that can be surrendered under the carbon pricing 
mechanism.
196
 The first type is carbon units that are sold by the federal Government through the Clean 
Energy Regulator. The second type is eligible international emissions units that are issued under the 
Kyoto Protocol or under the law of a foreign country, such as emissions units from the European 
Union emissions trading scheme. The third type is Australian Carbon Credit Units. These units are 
issued under the national Carbon Farming Initiative for eligible offsets projects. There are restrictions 
on the amount of international emissions units and Australian Carbon Credit Units that a liable entity 
can surrender in the first six years of the mechanism.
197
 
 
The aim of the carbon pricing mechanism is to reduce emissions generally, but in relation to coal-fired 
electricity generation specifically, as follows:  
(i) A carbon price will increase the cost and lower the profitability of coal-fired electricity 
generation.  
(ii) Changes to the business model of coal-fired electricity generators should include 
increases in energy efficiency, uptake of other emissions reduction methods and 
eventually closure of coal-fired electricity generation.  
(iii) A rising carbon price will also encourage investment in low-emissions and renewable 
electricity generation sources, and these sources will ultimately become cost-
competitive.
198
 This will lead to a widespread shift from coal-fired electricity generation 
                                                          
193  Ibid s 13. 
194  Or freely allocated. 
195  Peter Christoff, ‘Can the Invisible Hand Adjust the Thermostat? Carbon emissions trading and Australia’ in Tim 
Bonyhady and Peter Christoff (eds), Climate Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2007) 83. 
196 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5; Australian National Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (Cth) s 4. 
197 For the first five flexible charge years, eligible international emissions units cannot exceed 50 per cent of the units 
surrendered by a liable entity: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 133(7) (eligible international units in excess of 50 per cent will 
be banked for the following eligible financial year). Additionally a sub-limit of 12.5 per cent will apply to eligible Kyoto 
units surrendered by a liable entity: The Hon Greg Combet AM MP, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 
and the European Commission, ‘Australia and European Commission Agree on Pathway towards Fully Linking Emissions 
Trading Systems’ (Joint Media Release, 28 August 2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-
combet/2012/media-releases/August/JMR-20120828.aspx>. Regulations may prevent certain international units from being 
surrendered to ensure the environmental integrity of the scheme: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 123. In fixed charge years, 
ACCUs cannot exceed five per cent of the units a liable entity surrenders: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 125(7), 128(7), 
(8).  Once the flexible charge years commence, there are no restrictions on the amount of ACCUs that can be surrendered by 
a liable entity. 
198 Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian National Greenhouse Accounts: 
Quarterly update of Australia’s national greenhouse gas inventory, September quarter 2011 (2012), 20 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-change/emissions/2011-09/NGGI-Sept-quarter-2011-PDF.pdf>; The 
Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the global response to climate change, above n 4, 158. Gas, hydro, geothermal and 
nuclear are all potential sources of low-emissions electricity generation.   
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to low-emissions and renewable electricity generation, resulting in overall reduction of 
emissions.  
 
6.2.2 Effectiveness of CPM for reducing emissions from coal fired electricity  generation 
 
The effectiveness of the carbon pricing mechanism in achieving emissions reductions from coal-fired 
electricity generation will depend upon its design and specific features.  
 
First, the price of carbon must be high and the carbon pollution cap must be strict and lowered 
annually in order to achieve significant changes in behaviour and consequently emissions reductions. 
There are legislative constraints on the price of carbon for the first six years of the carbon pricing 
mechanism. The carbon price is fixed between $23 and $26 a tonne for the first three years.
199
 Upon 
commencement of the emissions trading scheme on 1 July 2015, a price ceiling will be in place for 
three years.
200
 The price ceiling will be set at $20 above the expected price for European emissions 
units in the financial year commencing 1 July 2015, and rise by 5 per cent in the following two 
financial years.
201
 This feature is designed to allow linkage of the Australian emissions trading scheme 
with the European Union emissions trading scheme. To further facilitate linkage, the Government has 
placed restrictions upon the use of international emissions units issued under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Kyoto units).
202
 Effectively this will mean that: 
 
(i) a large proportion of international emissions units surrendered under the Australian emissions 
trading scheme will be European Union emissions units; and  
(ii)  upon transition to an emissions trading scheme on 1 July 2015, the Australian price of 
 carbon will be set by the European Union price of carbon.
203
  
 
European Union emissions units were trading at below €5 per tonne in 2013,204 indicating that the 
proposed link with the European Union emissions trading scheme will significantly lower the 
Australian price of carbon from 1 July 2015 onwards.  
 
Modelling of the carbon price
205
necessary to drive a widespread shift from coal-fired electricity 
generation towards low-emissions or renewable electricity generation concludes that. a carbon price 
of A$30 to $A50 per tonne is required to make other sources of electricity generation cost-
                                                          
199  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100(1). 
200  Ibid. 
201   Australian Government, Linking and Australian liable entities (Clean Energy Future, 2013) 
<http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/linking-and-australian-liable-entities/> (‘Linking and Australian liable entities’). 
202  A sub-limit of 12.5 per cent will apply to eligible Kyoto units surrendered by a liable entity: The Hon Greg 
Combet AM MP, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, and the European Commission, ‘Australia and 
European Commission agree on pathway towards fully linking emissions trading systems’ (Joint Media Release, 28 August 
2012) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-combet/2012/media-releases/August/JMR-20120828.aspx>. 
Regulations may prevent certain international units from being surrendered to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
scheme: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 123. 
203 Linking and Australian liable entities, above n 201. 
204 Thomson Reuters Point Carbon News, Carbon Market Daily (30 May 2013) 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/cmd/1.2395667>. 
205 Deloitte, Investment Reference Group Report: A report to the Commonwealth Minister for resources and rnergy 
(Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2011) <http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy-
Security/IRG-report.pdf>; Jon Stanford, Power Generation in a Carbon Constrained World: Implications for the Australian 
resources sector (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2009) <http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/ Implications%20of%20CPRS.pdf>.   
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competitive.
206
 The combination of Australia’s price ceiling, and the likelihood of relatively low 
European Union carbon prices from 2015 onwards,
207
 will keep the carbon price from rising high 
enough to facilitate a switch away from coal-fired electricity generation in the first three years of the 
emissions trading scheme.  
 
Secondly, the carbon pollution cap will have a significant impact on the rate of emissions reductions 
from coal-fired electricity generation. A fixed price of carbon alone will not change behaviour of 
coal-fired electricity generators who can afford to pay the price and continue emitting. By placing a 
carbon pollution cap upon Australia’s covered emissions, demand for the right to emit one tonne of 
carbon dioxide (and associated requirement to purchase a carbon unit) will increase and so will the 
price of carbon. As the carbon pollution cap is lowered, demand for carbon units will grow stronger 
and the price of carbon will rise high enough to facilitate a switch away from coal-fired electricity 
generation. Annual carbon pollution caps will be imposed for each year from 1 July 2015,
208
 
restricting the number of carbon units that the Government can issue and theoretically placing a limit 
on Australia’s ‘covered emissions’.209 
 
However, covered emissions can exceed the cap where they are offset by surrender of Australian 
Carbon Credit Units or international emissions units.
210
 Surrender of these units will offset any excess 
covered emissions through the biosequestration of one tonne of carbon dioxide (Australian Carbon 
Credit Unit) or the emission of one less tonne of carbon dioxide in another jurisdiction (international 
emissions unit). The surrender of international emissions units and Australian Carbon Credit Units 
may result in Australia’s covered emissions significantly exceeding the carbon pollution cap. In 
particular it is possible that coal-fired electricity generators could continue to emit large amounts of 
carbon and surrender corresponding amounts of international emissions units and Australian Carbon 
Credit Units. Where international emissions units or Australian Carbon Credit Units do not represent 
credible and permanent reduction of emissions this will impact on the actual reduction of 
emissions.
211
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
206 Ibid both sources. See also Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Electricity Generation Investment Analysis: Final report (Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2011), 35 <http://www.ret.gov.au/energy/Documents/Energy-Security/Deloitte-Draft-Report-on-
Electricity-Investment-01.pdf>; Grant Anderson, ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Impact on the mining and energy 
industries’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 931, 935.   
207 See for example: carbon futures for December 2015 were trading at €9 in September 2012 (Thomson Reuters Point 
Carbon News, Carbon Market Daily (19 September 2012) 9(184) 1 
<http://www.pointcarbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.1993555!CMD20120919.pdf>); the international price of carbon is not 
predicted to rise above $US50 until after 2028 (Commonwealth Treasury, Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling a 
carbon price (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 37 
<http://cache.treasury.gov.au/treasury/carbonpricemodelling/content/report/downloads/Modelling_Report_Consolidated.pdf
>).     
208  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 14. 
209  ‘Covered emissions’ do not include emissions from certain sectors, such as emissions from agriculture and 
emissions from closed landfill facilities: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 30. 
210  Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 105. 
211 See Lisa Caripis et al, ‘Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 583, 592 (citing Carbon Trust, 
Global Carbon Mechanisms: Emerging Lessons and Implications CTC 748 (2009)); Nicola Swayne, ‘The Legal Framework 
for Australia‘s Carbon Pricing Mechanism: A critique’ (2011) 5 Environmental Liability 156, 165–6 and more generally 
Nicola Durrant, ‘Legal Issues in Carbon Farming: Biosequestration, carbon pricing and carbon rights’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 
515. Note, however, that regulations may place restrictions on the surrender of eligible international emissions units, having 
regard to the environmental integrity of the Act: Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 123(1), (2)(c).   
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6.3 Impacts on effectiveness of CPM to reduce emissions 
 
6.3.1 Role of environmental and planning laws 
 
The role of State and Territory environmental and planning laws in regulating the approval of new 
coal-fired electricity generation will be an important complement to the CPM.  Reliance solely upon a 
pricing mechanism to reduce emissions is unlikely to bring about a change in behaviour sufficient to 
lower emissions in the short term.  There is also a danger of political changes to the CPM which may 
lead to a reduction in the impact of the mechanism on emissions.
212
  
 
State legislative frameworks governing the establishment of power stations should complement the 
aims of the CPM by integrating principles of ESD within the decision making and approval process.  
As discussed in relation to Case Study 1, State processes for the approval of emission intensive 
activities should include within the environmental assessment phase specific consideration of 
emissions and impose conditions aimed at lowering emissions. The existing legislative framework 
provides scope for consideration of greenhouse gas emissions as part of the decision to grant an 
environmental or planning authorisation, but specific consideration is not always given in practice to 
the issue. Even where emissions are considered as part of the approval process rarely are conditions 
for the reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions imposed upon new coal-fired electricity 
generation.  An example would include conditions requiring a generation complex to adhere to an 
emissions intensity standard or a carbon capture and storage-ready (‘CCS-ready’) standard could be 
imposed. A CCS-ready standard requires that a new coal-fired power plant is approved and built in a 
way that will allow the retrofitting of CCS technology at an appropriate time in the future.
213
  
Queensland, Victoria and the Commonwealth have all indicated over recent years that CCS-ready 
conditions and emissions intensity conditions would be imposed upon new coal-fired electricity 
generation. However, all three jurisdictions subsequently reversed their position, stating that these 
conditions will not be necessary due to the operation of the carbon pricing mechanism.
214
 Other 
jurisdictions impose conditions for reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from new 
coal-fired electricity generation on a discretionary basis or not at all.
215
 
 
Arguably approval of new coal fired power stations without imposing conditions for the reduction of 
emissions or use of clean energy technology places unjustifiable reliance upon the ability of the CPM 
to deliver reduction in emissions. Clearly further integration and coherency is required between 
national laws and states laws approving emission intensive activities to ensure the consideration of 
social, economic and environmental issues at all stages of the regulatory framework. 
                                                          
212 The future of Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism after the 2013 federal election is uncertain. The leader of the 
opposing Coalition Government has vowed to repeal the scheme upon gaining power. It is unclear whether this is 
financially, legally or politically feasible. Recent modelling by Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that there is only a 
32% chance that the carbon pricing mechanism will be repealed after the 2013 federal election: Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, Will Australia’s Carbon Price Last? A 2013 update (Bloomberg Finance LP, 27 February 2013) 
<http://about.bnef.com/white-papers/will-australias-carbon-price-last-a-2013-update/>. 
213 Global CCS Institute, CCS Ready Policy and Regulations: The state of play (August 2012) 6. See also the proposed 
international definition of ‘CCS-ready’ in CCS Ready Policy: Considerations and recommended practices for policy makers 
(Global CCS Institute, 2010) 4.  
214 Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Draft Energy White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 
xxi ; Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet, Review of the Climate Change Act 2010 (State of Victoria, 2011) 35; 
Queensland Government Department of Energy and Water Supply, Conditions for new coal-fired electricity generation (State of 
Victoria, 2013) <http://www.energy.qld.gov.au/energy/coal-fired-elec-gen.htm>. 
215  See Christensen, Duncan and Phillips, ‘Regulation of Emissions under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism: A case study of 
Australia’s coal-fired electricity sector’, above n 183, 8. 
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6.3.2 Other legal instruments to reduce emissions 
 
The role of several other laws and policies which aim to reduce emissions from existing coal-fired 
electricity generation and encourage uptake of low-emissions and renewable electricity generation 
will also be important.
216
 These include energy efficiency measures applying to electricity generation 
and the national large-scale renewable energy target. Mandatory energy efficiency obligations are 
imposed under the Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 (Cth). The Act requires electricity 
generators that meet the energy use threshold
217
 to undertake an assessment of their energy efficiency 
opportunities and report publicly on the outcomes of that assessment.
218
Additionally, the large-scale 
Renewable Energy Target aims to generate 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity from renewable 
sources by 2020.
219
 The Target places a mandatory obligation upon wholesale electricity retailers and 
some electricity generators to acquire a set number of Large-scale Generation Certificates (LGCs) 
each year. The LGCs represent an amount of generated renewable energy electricity.  Energy 
efficiency obligations, the large-scale renewable energy target and the carbon pricing mechanism are 
all separate legislative schemes, although the latter two are both administered by the Clean Energy 
Regulator.  
 
State and Territory legislation also create offences for causing environmental harm or nuisance, and 
impose restrictions on undertaking activities that cause pollution or disposal of contaminants or 
waste.
220
 While drafted in wide terms which allow application to emissions from coal-fired electricity 
generation, in practice this is highly unlikely to occur if an environmental approval has been granted 
for a generation activities in the absence of conditions.
221
 The failure to impose conditions related to 
emissions in the approval process diminishes the effectiveness of offence provisions in giving effect 
to the polluter pays principle which should inform the state legislation.
222
    
 
6.3.3 Impact of transitional assistance for coal-fired generators 
 
Transitional assistance was provided to coal-fired electricity generators in the form of cash payments 
in 2012 and free carbon units to be issued in the years beginning 1 July 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.
223
 
                                                          
216 See Sholam Blustein, ‘Towards Low Emissions in the Electricity Generation Sector: Creating a coherent legal model for 
Australia’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 77 for further discussion of these laws.   
217 Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 (Cth) ss 9, 10. 
218 Ibid pts 6, 7.  
219 It is implemented through the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Regulations 2001 (Cth); Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth). 
220  Environment Protection Act 1997 (ACT) s 142 (placing pollutant where it could cause harm, but only if the 
pollutant is prescribed or exceeds the prescribed measure: s 5); Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) s 
95; Environmental Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 25; Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) s 51A; 
Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) s 41; Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 49; Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 (NSW) s 115(1); Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 443; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) 
s 40; Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) ss 49A, 50, 51. The Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) also makes it an 
offence to release a ‘prescribed contaminant’ (s 442), but greenhouse gas emissions are not a prescribed contaminant. 
221 See for example Gray v Macquarie Generation [2010] NSWLEC 34.  
222 See Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, above n 35, s 3.5.4.  
223 Cash payments were made in June 2012: Commonwealth Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Energy 
Security Fund Cash Payments: Guidelines for Applications for a Certificate of Eligibility for Coal-Fired Generation 
Assistance (Cash Payments) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), 6 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/government/initiatives/esf-cp/energy-security-fund-cash-
payments-guidelines-pdf.pdf>; Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 182. In the financial years 
beginning 1 July 2013, 2015 and 2016, 41.705 million free carbon units will be issued per year. The total number of units 
allocated in the 2014–15 financial year may differ from this number and is calculated according to a different formula which 
ensures that no more than 83.41 million free carbon units can be issued over the first two years of allocations: Clean Energy 
Act 2011 (Cth) s 161; Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 194, 197. 
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A generation complex must meet certain eligibility requirements for transitional assistance.
224
 It must 
be emissions-intensive and exposed to significant competition from lower-emissions electricity 
generation, and must also pass a ‘power system reliability test’ certifying that it will continue to 
provide a certain level of generation capacity. This test may act as a perverse incentive for a 
generation complex to continue in full operation, instead of reducing generation capacity, in order to 
receive transitional assistance.
225
  A generation complex must also submit a clean energy investment 
plan which ‘sets out’ plans for reducing emissions intensity, installing CCS technology and investing 
in clean energy.
226
 The flaw in this requirement is that there is no substantive obligation imposed to 
actually implement these plans. 
 
The conclusion of the research is that the provision of transitional assistance will undermine the 
operation of the carbon pricing mechanism. It will partially shield the coal-fired electricity sector from 
the impact of the carbon price. Provision of free carbon units to emitters will also reduce demand for 
carbon units once the emissions trading scheme commences, lowering the market price of carbon.
227
 
Additionally, coal-fired electricity generators that receive free carbon units may choose to pass the 
‘carbon costs’ onto retailers and/or consumers of electricity.228 This may result in windfall profits for 
coal-fired electricity generators that receive transitional assistance.
229
  
 
The provision of transitional assistance conflicts with the principles of ESD, in particular the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle.230 The assistance is benefitting large emitters of greenhouse gases economically, but 
fails to impose clear obligations in return for assistance such as reducing emissions through CCS 
technology, changing to clean energy technology or compensating the community for the impact of 
emissions. The Government’s justifications for transitional assistance includes maintenance of energy 
security, supporting investor confidence and compensation to coal-fired electricity generators for loss 
of asset value.
231
 These justifications are either unpersuasive
232
 or addressed through other means, 
including the introduction of an Energy Security Council and provision of transitional loan assistance 
to coal-fired electricity generators.
233
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
224  See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 5 (definition of ‘generation complex’), 161(1), 165, 166, 169-172. 
225 See Commonwealth Department of Climate Change, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2008), 387 <http://www.plantations2020.com.au/assets/acrobat/Greenpaper.pdf>   
226  Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 177. 
227 See Christoff, above n 195.   
228 See Alex Lo and Clive Spash, ‘Australia‘s Carbon Tax: A Wolf in Sheep‘s Clothing?’ (2012) 23 Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 67, 75; Carbon Pricing in the NEM: Day One (Frontier Economics, July 2012) <http://www.frontier-
economics.com/_library/publications/ frontier%20australia%20paper%20-%20carbon%20price%20in%20the%20nem%20-
%20day%20one.pdf>.    
229 See Yihsu Chen, Karsten Neuhoff and Jos Sijm, ‘CO2 Cost Pass Through and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector’ 
(2006) 6 (1) Climate Policy 49.  
230 See Markus Pohlmann, ‘The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’ in David Freestone and Charlotte Streck (eds), 
Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and beyond (Oxford University Press, 2009) 338, 357, 365; Robyn 
Briese, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Down Under: Legislative responses in a federal system’ (2010) 13 Asia Pacific Journal 
of Environmental Law 75, 82.   
231 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 159. 
232 See Caripis et al, above n 211.   
233 See The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the global response to climate change, above n 4, 159-62. Clean Energy Act 
2011 (Cth) s 303B (provision for transitional loan assistance to coal-fired electricity generators); Australian Government, 
Energy Security Council <http://www.energysecuritycouncil.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=home.htm>. 
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6.4 Conclusions and Recommended Reform 
 
Reducing Australia’s reliance upon coal-fired electricity generation is a significant challenge for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The carbon pricing mechanism alone will not achieve significant 
reduction of emissions from coal-fired electricity generation before 2020. Features of the carbon 
pricing mechanism such as legislative constraints on the carbon price, an ability to exceed the carbon 
pollution cap through surrender of international emissions units, and provision of transitional 
assistance will detract from its effectiveness in reducing emissions from coal-fired electricity 
generation. The carbon pricing mechanism alone is unlikely to constitute a legal instrument that will 
drive significant and rapid emissions reductions from the coal-fired electricity sector.  A portfolio of 
legal instruments will be required to encourage behavioural change from the coal-fired electricity 
sector, increase the market share of low-emissions and renewable electricity generation, and ensure 
significant emissions reductions. These instruments should complement the carbon pricing 
mechanism.  
 
 Energy efficiency requirements for coal-fired electricity generation should be retained.  
 Direct regulation such as feed-in tariff schemes and the large-scale renewable energy target 
should be retained. 
 A prohibition on new coal-fired electricity generation should ideally be imposed but this may 
not be politically feasible.  
 Emissions from new coal-fired electricity generation should be regulated through the 
imposition of nationally consistent, mandatory conditions of approval requiring: 
(a) an emissions intensity standard of 0.80 or below; and  
(b)  installation of CCS-ready equipment. 
 These conditions of approval are necessary because the carbon pricing mechanism will not 
directly affect either the emissions intensity of a new coal-fired generation complex or its use 
of carbon capture and storage technology.  Conditions should be framed in a manner that is 
complementary to the operation of the carbon pricing mechanism.  
 Measures such as the renewable energy target and conditions of approval for reduction and 
mitigation of emissions from new coal-fired electricity generation will be necessary as 
transitional support for the carbon pricing mechanism. Once the carbon price rises high 
enough to facilitate a widespread shift away from coal-fired electricity generation these 
instruments should be abolished. 
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7. Legislative Case Study Three – Carbon Capture and Storage 
 
7.1 Overview Case Study Three
234
 
Geological sequestration of carbon is more commonly known as carbon capture and storage, or 
‘CCS’. CCS involves the capture of carbon emissions from fossil fuel-fired electricity generation or 
other industrial processes, followed by transport of the emissions and injection for permanent storage 
into an underground storage formation.
235
 CCS removes and stores carbon dioxide that would 
otherwise be emitted into the atmosphere and is regarded as a key measure for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This technology has the potential to assist in achieving national emissions 
reduction targets but there are currently no large-scale integrated (integrating capture, transport and 
storage) CCS projects operational in Australia. There are a number of factors impacting on the 
commercial implementation of CCS technology and that are relevant to the operation of the legal 
framework.  
First the process is very expensive. Although costs will vary depending on the project characteristics, 
current cost estimates range from $16 to $151 per tonne of carbon dioxide stored on the East Coast of 
Australia, and from $10 to $4,400 per tonne of carbon dioxide stored on the West Coast.
236
 In order 
for a project to be financially and commercially viable, the capital and operational costs of CCS must 
be less than the carbon price. Otherwise, an emitter will presumably take the cheaper option of 
emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and paying the carbon price.  
Secondly, CCS projects also carry a number of risks. The main risks arise from leakage of carbon 
dioxide during the injection and storage phases of the project. Carbon dioxide could potentially 
migrate into linked underground saline reservoirs, unlinked underground reservoirs (through faults or 
fractures) including groundwater reservoirs, adjacent mineral or hydrocarbon reserves or onto the land 
surface.
237
 Leakage of stored carbon dioxide could result in changes to subsurface pressure leading to 
induced seismic activity, contamination of groundwater, impacts upon natural resources such as 
forests or vegetation through escape to the surface, and loss or damage to adjacent mineral, oil or gas 
reserves.
238
  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that the fraction of carbon dioxide 
retained in an appropriately selected and managed storage formation is “very likely” to exceed 99% 
                                                          
234 Material in this case study was originally published in the following source and reproduced with the permission of the 
publisher: Nicola Swayne and Angela Phillips, ‘Legal Liability for Carbon Capture and Storage in Australia: Where should 
the losses fall?’ (2012) 29 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 1. 
235 See Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS: 2012 (2012) 9. 
236 Guy Allinson et al, The Costs of CO2 Transport and Injection in Australia: Final report (Commonwealth Department of 
Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2009) 27. 
237 Les LoBaugh, ‘Legal and Regulatory Challenges of Geological Carbon Capture and Sequestration: US hurdles to 
reducing CO2 emissions’ in Ian Havercroft, Richard Macrory and Richard Stewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: 
Emerging legal and regulatory issues (Hart Publishing, 2011) 73. 
238 See Elizabeth Wilson et al, ‘Liability and Financial Responsibility Frameworks for Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration’(2007) 3 World Resources Institute Issue Brief: Carbon Capture and Sequestration 3, 4; Stuart Haszeldine, 
‘Geological Factors in Framing Legislation to Enable and Regulate Storage of Carbon Dioxide Deep in the Ground’ in Ian 
Havercroft, Richard Macrory and Richard Stewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging legal and regulatory 
issues (Hart Publishing, 2011) 16; Stefan Bachu, Michael Celia and Sarah Gasda, ‘Spatial Characterization of the Location 
of Potentially Leaky Wells Penetrating a Deep Saline Aquifer in a Mature Sedimentary Basin’ (2004) 46 (6-7) 
Environmental Geology 707, 708. 
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over 100 years and “likely” to exceed 99% over 1000 years.239 However, there is a great deal still to 
be learnt about the risks of CCS and current risk modelling has a number of limitations.
240
   
The legal framework regulating the use of carbon capture and storage for mitigation of emissions 
therefore needs to carefully balance the cost of implementing a CCS project with the potential 
environmental benefits and scientific uncertainties and social impact of environmental harm.  The 
proper integration of ESD principles is crucial at the approval stage and throughout the life of the 
project.   
The focus of the case study is the management of risks of environmental harm from CCS projects, and 
the allocation of responsibility for environmental harm if it does occur. The key aspects considered in 
the case study are: 
(i) the extent to which ESD principles are integrated within the decision making process to 
approve a CCS project;  
(ii) whether the approach taken to managing the risk of environmental harm is consistent with 
ESD principles;  
(iii) the effectiveness of the legislative framework in allocating responsibility for avoiding or 
remediating environmental harm.  
 
7.2 Overview of legal regime for carbon capture and storage 
CCS is a novel technology requiring significant capital investment by project proponents. The legal 
regime must encourage private industry investment for CCS projects while managing the novel risks 
of projects to protect the public and private interest.
241
 The Commonwealth, Victorian, Queensland, 
South Australian and Western Australian Governments have enacted legislation regulating onshore 
and offshore CCS projects.
242
 The scope of this case study will however be restricted to the 
Commonwealth, Queensland and Victorian legislation as jurisdictions in which commercial projects 
are likely to occur.
243
  The Gorgon project in WA is due to commence operation in 2015. This project 
is an offshore gas development project which will be regulated under the Commonwealth regime. The 
Victorian CarbonNet project, Western Australian South West Hub project and Queensland Surat 
Basin project are currently under evaluation. These projects are undertaking modelling and testing of 
potential storage sites, acquiring data, and undergoing restructuring. Finally, the Callide Oxyfuel 
Project in Queensland is an integrated demonstration project on a smaller scale. It aims to capture 
carbon emissions by retrofitting capture technology onto an existing coal-fired power station, and then 
transport and store the emissions. This project has commenced capture of emissions, but the final 
storage site has not yet been determined. 
The legal framework for approval and management of geological sequestration activities is similar to 
existing statutory frameworks for regulation of mining and petroleum activities. A project proponent 
                                                          
239 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide and Storage: Summary for policy 
makers and technical summary (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2005)14. 
240 Haszeldine, above n 238, 17; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: Options for a carbon-
constrained world (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 51 <http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf>. 
241 Victor Flatt, ‘Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal’ (2009) 19 Duke Environmental Law and Policy 
Forum 211, 220. 
242 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth); Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic); Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic); Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2009 (Qld); Barrow Island Act 2003 (WA); Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (SA). See also 
Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Legislation Amendment Bill 2012 (WA). 
243 See Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS: 2012 (2012) at 28 for details of all current Australian CCS projects.  
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must obtain an exploration or assessment permit to explore an area for its viability for geological 
sequestration.
244
 The proponent may then apply for an injection lease or licence which will confer 
rights to inject and store carbon dioxide.
245
 State environmental approval will also need to be obtained 
for a geological sequestration project, including the process of environmental impact assessment. 
Federal environmental approval under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
(Cth) will be required where a proposed project will have impacts on a matter of national 
environmental significance.
246
 
Once an injection lease or licence is granted, injection and storage of carbon dioxide generally must 
commence within 5 years,
247
 failing which the licence may be revoked.
248
 A project proponent must 
comply with the approved injection and monitoring plan,
249
 reporting requirements imposed by the 
legislation,
250
 and any directions issued by the Minister.
251
 When injection and storage of carbon 
dioxide has ceased the project proponent may commence the site closure process. The Government 
will assume responsibility for monitoring the project site upon completion of the site closure process. 
However, the issue of long-term liability for leakage of carbon dioxide is not comprehensively 
addressed in any jurisdiction.  
7.3 Approval process for CCS projects 
The approval process for CCS projects is similar across jurisdictions. The holder of a greenhouse gas 
assessment or exploration tenement may apply for an injection and storage tenement.
252
 An injection 
and storage tenement will generally only be granted where an appropriate underground storage 
formation exists within the tenement area. Commonwealth and offshore Victoria legislation 
specifically requires that the Minister make a declaration of an ‘identified greenhouse gas storage 
formation’.253 This declaration will set out matters such as the particular amount suitable to be 
injected in the formation, the particular greenhouse gas substance suitable to be injected in the 
formation, the particular or points are which injection is suitable, the period of time over which 
injection is suitable, the effective sealing feature, attribute or mechanism that enables the permanent 
storage, and the engineering enhancements necessary (if any) to enable permanent storage 
(‘fundamental suitability determinants’).254 The holder of a greenhouse gas injection licence must 
                                                          
244 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ch 2; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ch 3, pt 
3.2. 
245 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 110, ch 3; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 
372(1), ch 3, pt 3.4; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 357; Greenhouse Gas Geological 
Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 71. 
246 See above n 44.  
247 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 382, 383; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 
167; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 66, 67. 
248 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 360, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 378. 
249 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 93-96, 106. 
250 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 111, 112; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ch 5 pt 
4.  
251 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 6, 89-91, 107, 109, 182, 183; Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 376, 379, 380, 382, 383, 580; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 363, 
364, 366; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 401, 405, 406, 409, 410, 629. 
252 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 113; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 72; Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 361; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 
(Vic) s 379. 
253 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 312; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 315, 318. 
254 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 21(1),(8); Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 23(1),(8). 
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conduct operations in accordance with the specified fundamental suitability determinants.
255
 In other 
jurisdictions the requirement for suitability is less explicit although the application documents or site 
plans must outline similar matters.
256
 
All jurisdictions set out matters which the Minister must take into consideration when deciding 
whether to grant a greenhouse gas injection licence. The Victorian onshore legislation requires the 
Minister to consider the merits of the proposed work program, the suitability of the underground 
formation for storage, and the likelihood of permanent containment of the greenhouse gas 
substance.
257
 Queensland legislation requires the Minister to consider, inter alia, whether an 
environmental authority has been issued and whether the applicant has entered into a commercial 
arrangement for greenhouse gas stream storage in the greenhouse gas lease’s area.258 Commonwealth 
and offshore Victoria legislation requires consideration of whether injection will commence within 5 
years and the draft site plan is adequate, and whether there is a significant risk that greenhouse gas 
injections and storage operations will have a significant adverse impact on petroleum exploration or 
recovery operations.
259
All jurisdictions require consideration of whether the applicant has the 
necessary financial and technical resources and ability to carry out greenhouse gas stream storage.
260
  
Impacts on surrounding land and water resources from CCS projects are generally not considered as 
part of the decision-making process, although there may be a requirement to consider and address 
these impacts as part of the site plan or injection and monitoring plan.
261
 The main emphasis of CCS 
frameworks is addressing the impacts of greenhouse gas sequestration operations upon surrounding 
resources such as petroleum.
262
 There is also a requirement for proponents of onshore projects 
conducted upon private land to enter into compensation agreements with the landowner(s).
263
 
The principles of sustainable development are not explicitly integrated into approval processes for 
CCs projects. The threat of serious or irreversible environmental harm from a large-scale leakage of 
carbon dioxide from a CCS project would appear to activate the precautionary principle. Onshore and 
offshore Victorian legislation states that regard should be given to the principles of sustainable 
development, including the precautionary principle, in administering the legislation.
264
 However the 
approval processes and operational requirements in the legislation do not require specific 
consideration or application of the precautionary principle.    
                                                          
255 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 358; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 374.  
256 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 141, 142; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 73. 
257 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 82. 
258 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 117, 118. 
259 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 362, 370; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 382, 383. 
260 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 117, 118; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 
362, 370; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 382, 383. Application for injection licence 
must include details of applicant’s relevant technical qualifications and the financial resources available to the applicant: 
Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 75. 
261 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 141, 144, 147, 149; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 
(Vic) ss 209-10; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 457; Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 2009 (Cth) s 3.4(10); Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 
(Vic) s 492; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulations 2011 (Vic) s 166(i). 
262 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 93-96, 98, 104; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 376; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 401.  
263 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 200, 201; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ch 5, pts 
7, 10. 
264 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 8; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2010 (Vic) s 61.   
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7.4 Managing the risk of environmental harm  
The approval process focuses primarily upon the viability of the project, suitability of the storage 
formation and potential risks to surrounding resources. Risks of environmental harm are left to be 
managed throughout the operational stage of a CCS project.
265
 The legislation appears to take an 
adaptive management approach
266
 through the use of Ministerial powers to respond and adjust the 
operation of the project.  
7.4.1 Operational phase of carbon capture and storage projects 
All CCS legislation provides for the grant of a greenhouse gas storage lease or licence. Rights to 
inject and store carbon dioxide are subject to ministerial powers to intervene in the carrying out of 
CCS projects. The relevant Minister may issue directions relating to the composition and origins of 
the injected carbon dioxide and the volume and rate of injection.
267
 There are also a broad range of 
ministerial powers to issue directions where a ‘serious situation’ exists in relation to the project.268 
‘Serious situation’ is widely defined and may include where carbon dioxide injected into the 
underground storage formation has leaked, there is a significant risk that it will leak in the course of 
being injected, or the carbon dioxide being injected is behaving otherwise than as predicted. Once a 
‘serious situation’ is triggered, the Minister can issue directions requiring the proponent to take any 
action, carry out the injection of carbon dioxide in a particular manner or to cease or suspend the 
injection of carbon dioxide. Additional notices and directions may be issued, such as orders to 
rehabilitate the environment.
269
 Overall there is a high risk of ministerial intervention into the carrying 
out of CCS projects to address risks of environmental harm.  
7.4.2 Closure of carbon capture and storage projects 
Risks of environmental harm from leakage of carbon dioxide will continue once injection of carbon 
dioxide has ceased. CCS legislation attempts to manage these risks through the site closure process. 
Once this process has been completed by a CCS project proponent, long-term responsibilities for 
monitoring and verification of the project will be handed over to the State. CCS legislation imposes a 
number of pre-requisites for site closure and handover of responsibility. Generally, the project 
proponent must apply for a ‘site closing certificate’ or surrender of the lease or licence.270 At this 
stage the Minister may issue site closing directions requiring the proponent to carry out specified 
actions to reduce the risks of long-term storage.
271
  
An application for site closure will only be approved once the Minister is satisfied that the injected 
carbon dioxide is behaving as predicted and the risks associated with permanent storage have been 
                                                          
265 Although environmental impacts from the project will be considered and addressed through the process for grant of an 
environmental or planning approval.  
266 For example, the Queensland government states that there is an adaptive environmental management system in place for 
greenhouse gas storage projects: Queensland Government Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Adaptive 
Management, above n 87. 
267 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 89-91, 107, 109. 
268 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 379, 380, 382; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 
(Qld) ss 363, 364, 366; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) ss 6, 182, 183; Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 405, 406, 409. 
269 See Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 376(1), 383, 580; Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) ss 401(1), 410, 629. 
270 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 386(4); Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 415; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 174; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration 
Act 2008 (Vic) s 168(1). 
271 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 593; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 641; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 178. 
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reduced as much as is reasonably practicable.
272
 These discretionary thresholds will create uncertainty 
for the project proponent who will be unable to predict when they will be able to surrender their lease 
or licence and hand over responsibility for the project site.
273
 A project proponent may also be 
required to pay additional sums of money to cover long-term monitoring and verification of the 
project before site closure is approved.
274
 
7.5 Responsibility for environmental harm 
Environmental harm from CCS projects may lead to common law or statutory liability for the project 
proponent or other parties such as the Crown. CCS legislation sets out responsibility for 
environmental harm to some extent
275
 but there is still significant uncertainty surrounding this matter.  
The risks of leakage during the injection and storage phases of a CCS project present a number of 
potential liabilities for the proponent. First, tortious liabilities may arise in the form of actions brought 
against the proponent for trespass, nuisance or negligence.
276
 The specific elements of trespass and 
nuisance actions will be exceedingly difficult to prove in the context of leakage from a CCS project.
277
 
An action for negligence could also be brought against the project proponent where leakage from a 
CCS project causes damage to a third party. However, the establishment of a reasonable standard of 
care for a novel CCS project will be a challenging task.
278
 It may also be difficult to prove that carbon 
dioxide leakage from the storage formation has caused the specific damage alleged by the third 
party.
279
  
The potential liabilities arising from leakage from a CCS project are further complicated by: 
i. Ministerial powers to intervene in the carrying out of a project, including directions to 
change the volume or rate at which carbon dioxide is injected; and 
ii. uncertainty surrounding ownership of carbon dioxide during injection and storage of the 
gas.  
The exercise of Ministerial powers of intervention will increase the difficulty of determining 
causation where a project proponent is faced with allegations of negligence. Some CCS legislation 
contains limited statutory protections from liability for a project proponent who is acting under a 
direction issued by the Minister.
280
  
Furthermore, ownership of the storage formation, sequestered gas and associated infrastructure are 
likely to be a starting point for determining legal responsibility for any harm caused by leakage of 
carbon dioxide. Ownership of these components of a CCS project is only partially addressed in the 
                                                          
272 See Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 399; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 
179; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 170. 
273 Meredith Gibbs, ‘Greenhouse Gas Storage in Offshore Waters: Balancing competing interests’ (2009) 28(1) Australian 
Resources and Energy Law Journal 52, 70. 
274 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 174(1); Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2006 (Cth) s 391; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 426; Environmental Protection Act 
1994 (Qld) s 311T. 
275 See Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) ss 400, 401, 768; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2009 (Qld) s 425; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 787. 
276 See generally Frances McGlone and Amanda Stickley, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2009). 
277 See for example Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio St 3d (1996) 24-27. 
278 See McGlone and Stickley, above n 276, 148-149; Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson, ‘Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a liability regime for long-term storage of carbon dioxide’ (2008) 58 Emory Law Journal 103, 137.   
279 Mark De Figueiredo, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007) <http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/Mark_de_Figueiredo_PhD_Dissertation.pdf>; Klass and 
Wilson, above n 278, 137.   
280 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 768; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 425; 
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 787. 
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legislation. Potential owners of these components are the project proponent, the landowner (if the 
project is conducted on private land) or the Crown (if the project is conducted on public land). CCS 
frameworks do not take a consistent approach to addressing ownership of the storage formation, 
sequestered gas or associated infrastructure. Queensland legislation sets out ownership of project 
infrastructure throughout the life of the project while all other jurisdictions are silent on this matter.
281
 
In all jurisdictions except for the Commonwealth, ownership of the storage formation is vested in the 
Crown throughout the life of the project.
282
 Commonwealth legislation does not address ownership of 
the storage formation. Finally, all jurisdictions are silent on ownership of the sequestered gas during 
the injection and storage phases of a CCS project. Upon site closure and surrender of the relevant 
lease or licence, the Crown is vested with ownership of the sequestered gas in Victoria and 
Queensland while the Commonwealth legislation remains silent.
283
 Failure to specify ownership of the 
sequestered gas through legislation may lead to application of the common law principles regarding 
fixtures and chattels.
284
 It is impossible to come to a satisfactory conclusion upon ownership of 
sequestered gas through an application of these principles. 
Although a project proponent is likely to be at least partially responsible for environmental harm 
occurring during the operational stages of a CCS project, the extent and scope of a proponent’s long-
term liability is unclear. All jurisdictions take a different legislative approach to a project proponent’s 
long-term liability after the site closure process has been completed. The Commonwealth legislation 
states that a ‘closure assurance period’ can be declared 15 years after the site closing certificate has 
been issued providing that the sequestered carbon dioxide is behaving as predicted.
285
 Once this 
closure assurance period has been declared, the Commonwealth will provide an indemnity for 
damages to the project proponent. This indemnity extends to a liability of the current or former project 
proponent (holder of the injection licence), incurred or accrued after the closure assurance period has 
been declared, which is attributable to an act or omission that occurred during the carrying out of 
authorised activities for the CCS project.
286
 The legislation does not specify a test of causation that 
will apply to determine whether the liability is ‘attributable’ to a particular act or omission.  In 
circumstances where the project proponent has ceased to exist, liability will attach to the 
Commonwealth instead provided that the above conditions are satisfied.
287
   
Legislation in all other jurisdictions is silent on the issue of long-term liability. In Queensland, it is 
noted that ‘the issue of long-term liability remains complex’ while the Victorian government has 
stated that common law liability remains with the proponent.
288
 This is problematic due to significant 
concerns of private entities that long-term liability will be retained by the project proponent rather 
than being transferred to the Crown.
289
 
                                                          
281 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) ss 250-252, 269, 326, 327. 
282 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 27; Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 14; Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) s 65.  
283 Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) s 16; Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2010 (Vic) s 67; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) s 181(2). 
284 See North Shore Gas Co Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1940) 63 CLR 52; Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 
7 CP 328.  
285 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) s 399.  
286 Ibid s 400. 
287 Ibid s 401. 
288 International Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and Storage: Legal and regulatory review (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development/International Energy Agency, 2011) 72, 76. The report comprises of government position 
statements from the various jurisdictions. 
 
289 Haszeldine, above n 238, 18. 
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Overall a project proponent is faced with significant uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of 
their responsibility for environmental harm. Site closure thresholds are largely dependent upon the 
discretion of the Minister and the scope of a project proponent’s long-term liability following site 
closure is unclear. The differing liability rules presented across the jurisdictions will create 
unnecessary legal uncertainty and higher transaction costs and ultimately act as a barrier to the 
commercial deployment of CCS technology.
290
 Furthermore, the application of the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle would appear to require that the project proponent remains responsible for any 
environmental harm caused by the leakage of carbon dioxide. This is not clear from the legislation as 
it currently stands.  
7.5.1 Responsibility for carbon dioxide leakage under the carbon pricing mechanism 
Liable entities under the carbon pricing mechanism can reduce their liability by transferring emissions 
for permanent storage using CCS. Estimates of emissions under the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) can be reduced by the amount of carbon dioxide captured and transferred to 
a project proponent for permanent storage.
291
 The project proponent will issue a certificate to the 
liable entity specifying the amount of carbon dioxide transferred for permanent storage.
292
  
However, there are no legal implications under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 
2007 (Cth) or the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) if there is subsequent leakage of carbon dioxide from 
a CCS project. Emissions are not accounted for under either Act unless there are ministerial methods 
or criteria by which the emissions are to be measured.
293
 Current ministerial determinations for CCS 
projects extend only to the measurement of fugitive emissions from the transport of carbon dioxide 
captured for permanent storage.
294
 Additionally, requirements to account for emissions under the 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) or the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) will 
only arise if emissions from a particular source amount to 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide or more 
annually.
295
 This will not cover insidious leaks from CCS projects that do not meet the 25,000 tonnes 
per annum threshold.  
The current legislation creates an environment where a liable entity is able to reduce their liability 
under the carbon pricing mechanism by transferring their emissions for permanent storage without 
any equivalent responsibility being placed upon the project proponent for any losses of those 
emissions. This is a fragmented and counterproductive approach which effectively does not require 
permanent storage of carbon dioxide once transferred and injected.  
 
7.6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Legal frameworks for CCS must meet the environmental objective of ensuring permanent storage of 
carbon dioxide and avoiding harm from leakage. Economic considerations are also relevant due to the 
projected initial costs of CCS operations and the potential costs that may arise from a project 
proponent’s long-term liability for the sequestered carbon dioxide. The legal regime must integrate 
                                                          
290 Klass and Wilson, above n 278, 123. 
291 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) s 1.19B. 
Carbon dioxide is captured for permanent storage only if it is captured by, or transferred to 
the holder of a greenhouse gas injection licence/lease or approval under the Commonwealth, 
State or Territory CCS legislation: National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (NGER 
Determination 2008) s 1.19A. 
292 Ibid s 1.19B. 
293 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) ss 10, 13; Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 30(1). 
294 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) ss 3.91-3.92. 
295 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) ss 12, 13; Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20-22. 
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both environmental and economic considerations by providing a clear framework for the allocation of 
responsibility for environmental harm. Current legal frameworks for CCS could incorporate the 
following proposals for reform: 
 Legislation in all jurisdictions should set out ownership of the storage formation, sequestered 
gas and associated infrastructure during the injection, storage and post-site closure stages of a 
CCS project.  
 The treatment of long-term liability for CCS projects should be clarified and consistent across 
jurisdictions. The transfer of responsibility to the Crown after site closure should be 
comprehensively set out, including the nature of liability to be transferred, the scope of any 
indemnities provided and the timing for the provision of any legal protections. Consideration 
should be given to application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
 Proper accountabilities under the carbon pricing mechanism should be placed upon all 
leakages from CCS projects within Australia.  
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8. Legislative Case Study Four – Biological Sequestration 
8.1 Overview Case Study Four
296 
 
 
Biosequestration is the process whereby plants sequester carbon from the atmosphere and store it in 
trees, vegetation and the subsurface including roots and soil. Biosequestration reduces the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and is therefore an important method for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases and mitigation of climate change.
297
 Until recently, Australia’s approach to 
biosequestration was to restrict or prohibit vegetation clearing so as to increase absorption of carbon 
by maintaining vegetation.
298
 There has been a move away from prescriptive regulation to an 
approach that provides financial incentives for landowners and investors to undertake biosequestration 
activities.
299
 The cornerstone of this approach is the federal Carbon Farming Initiative, which is an 
incentive-based scheme for biosequestration projects. The Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming 
Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (‘CFI Act’) allows landowners and investors to gain tradeable carbon offset 
credits called Australian Carbon Credit Units (‘ACCUs’) by undertaking ‘eligible offsets projects’. 
These are projects that sequester carbon from the atmosphere and store it in living biomass, dead 
organic matter or soil (‘sequestration offsets projects’) or that reduce emissions at source in relation to 
agriculture and other specified activities (‘emissions avoidance offsets projects’).300 The CFI Act 
provides a framework for the establishment of eligible offsets projects at a national level, but relies 
upon State legislation for the creation of a valid interest in land to support the project and allows for 
the surrender of ACCUs under the Commonwealth carbon pricing mechanism. 
Unlike the process of geological sequestration examined in case study 3, biosequestration does not 
present the same environmental risks to surrounding land, air or water and therefore, does not require 
the same regulatory safeguards for managing environmental harm. A more significant issue is the 
impact of environmental hazards on the sustainability of the sequestered carbon pool and the 
consequences of disturbance or destruction on the integrity of ACCUs issued for the project. 
Therefore, while the effectiveness of the CFI scheme is also dependent upon the integration of 
economic, environmental and social considerations within the regulatory framework, the focus of 
these considerations is on protection of an offsets project from environmental impacts and human 
intervention, rather than minimising the environmental harm caused by the project.  
                                                          
296 Material in this case study was originally published in the following sources and is reproduced here with the permission 
of the publishers: Sharon Christensen, Pamela O'Connor, W D Duncan and Angela Phillips, ‘Issues in Negotiating a Carbon 
Sequestration Agreement for a Biosequestration Offsets Project’ (2013) 21(3) Australian Property Law Journal 195; Nicola 
Durrant, ‘Legal Issues in Carbon Farming: Biosequestration, carbon pricing, and carbon rights’ (2011) 2(4) Climate Law 
515.  
The material contained in this case study is also further developed in two forthcoming publications: Pamela O'Connor, 
‘Contractual Specification of New Property Rights in Resources: The problem of measurement costs’ Monash Law Review 
(In Press, 2013); Pamela O'Connor, Sharon Christensen, W D Duncan and Angela Phillips, ‘From Rights to Responsibilities: 
Reconceptualising carbon sequestration rights in Australia’ Environmental and Planning Law Journal (In Press, 2013). 
297 Australian Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The Australian Government’s climate change plan, above n 
34, 14-15; Kyoto Protocol, above n 24, arts 2, 3, 17; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 23, 
art 4.   
298 See, for example, Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) pt 2; Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) pts 3, 4; Native 
Vegetation Act 1991 (SA) pt 5; Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) pt V, div 2. See also Justine Bell, ‘Tree Clearing, 
Hunger Strikes, and the Kyoto Protocol: The need for a middle ground’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 
201, 204. 
299 Productivity Commission, Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2004), 194-195 <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/49235/nativevegetation.pdf >. 
300 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) ss 53, 54.  
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The regulatory framework governing biosequestration must integrate the economic consideration of 
providing incentives for the uptake of projects, and the environmental, economic and social 
considerations of ensuring permanent, measureable and verifiable emissions reductions to underpin 
the market for ACCUs. Several key aspects underpin the legislative framework: 
(i) The decision-making process for approval of a project under the CFI Act; 
(ii) The security of an interest in land for the project proponent to ensure the benefits of the  
project can continue for at least 100 years; 
(iii) Enforcement toolkit for the regulator to ensure compliance by the project proponent and 
maintenance of the carbon pool for at least 100 years; 
(iv) Strict requirements for measuring and calculating sequestered carbon for the issue of 
ACCUs. 
This case study examines the extent to which environmental, social and economic considerations are 
integrated into each of the key aspects of the regulatory framework and whether they contribute to a 
sustainable regime.  
8.2 Australian legal framework for biosequestration 
 
The legal framework regulating biosequestration offsets projects is comprised of the CFI Act, the 
Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011 (Cth), and any applicable methodology 
determination for the project.
301
 The Carbon Farming Initiative is administered by the Clean Energy 
Regulator who will approve biosequestration offsets projects, issue ACCUs for the project and 
undertake compliance action when necessary.  
The Clean Energy Regulator may issue one ACCU to the project proponent for each tonne of carbon 
dioxide sequestered by an eligible offsets project.
302
 ACCUs issued under the Carbon Farming 
Initiative are divided into ‘Kyoto ACCUs’ and ‘non-Kyoto ACCUs’.303 Biosequestration offsets 
projects undertaking activities that count towards Australia’s emissions reductions targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol can be issued with Kyoto ACCUs, while project undertaking other types of activities 
will be issued with non-Kyoto ACCUs.
304
 Kyoto-approved biosequestration activities include 
reforestation and avoided deforestation. Other biosequestration activities such as soil carbon, 
improved forest management and non-forest revegetation are not currently recognised under the 
Kyoto Protocol.
305
 Due to the status of international negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol, ACCUs 
issued for biosequestration offsets projects undertaking Kyoto-approved activities are known as ‘non-
Kyoto (eligible) ACCUs’ from 1 January 2013.306 
                                                          
301 Current methodology determinations for biosequestration projects are: Carbon Farming (Quantifying Carbon 
Sequestration by Permanent Environmental Plantings of Native Tree Species using the CFI Reforestation Modelling Tool) 
Methodology Determination 2012 (Cth); Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Reforestation and Afforestation) 
Methodology Determination 2013 (Cth); Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Human Induced Regeneration of a 
Permanent Even-Aged Native Forest) Methodology Determination 2013 (Cth); Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) 
(Quantifying Carbon Sequestration by Permanent Mallee Plantings using the Reforestation Modelling Tool) Methodology 
Determination 2013 (Cth).  
302 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) ss 16-18.  
303 Ibid ss 11, 55.   
304 Ibid ss 53, 54.  
305 See Australian Government, Clean Energy Regulator: Carbon Farming Initiative Markets (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2013) <http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Farming-Initiative/Pages/default.aspx>  
306 See Australian Government, Clean Energy Regulator: Carbon Farming Initiative (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Farming-Initiative/Pages/default.aspx>  
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Kyoto ACCUs and non-Kyoto (eligible) ACCUs can be surrendered under the carbon pricing 
mechanism by a liable entity.
307
 Each ACCU surrendered by a liable entity represents one tonne of 
carbon sequestered or avoided that will offset one tonne of carbon emitted by the liable entity. Hence, 
instead of reducing its emissions by a certain amount, a liable entity may choose to acquire and 
surrender ACCUs representing that amount. In the first three years of the carbon pricing mechanism, 
ACCUs cannot exceed five per cent of the units surrendered by a liable entity. Upon transition to an 
emissions trading scheme on 1 July 2015, there are no restrictions on the amount of ACCUs that can 
be surrendered by a liable entity.  
A biosequestration offsets project will commence and operate in the following manner. First, the 
project proponent must apply to the Clean Energy Regulator for approval of a proposed 
biosequestration offsets project.
308
 There are a number of requirements which must be satisfied before 
approval will be granted, and other approvals for the project may be required under state or federal 
planning, environmental or water legislation. The proponent for a biosequestration offsets project 
must also hold the ‘applicable carbon sequestration right’ over the project area.309 The applicable 
carbon sequestration right is obtained under state laws. Each state in Australia has legislated to create 
property rights over carbon sequestered in trees, forests and vegetation (‘carbon sequestration 
rights’).310 These rights are used to support the marketability of biosequestration offsets projects by 
securing permanence of emissions reductions and clarifying ownership of sequestered carbon.
311
  
Once approved, a biosequestration offsets project must be conducted in accordance with a 
methodology determination.
312
 Each methodology determination sets out eligibility and operational 
requirements for a particular type of project.
313
 The project proponent must comply with ongoing 
monitoring and reporting obligations to ensure that real, verifiable and credible emissions reductions 
are occurring under the project.
314
 Monitoring, inspecting and auditing powers are also granted to the 
Clean Energy Regulator.
315
 
The CFI Act aims to ensure compliance through imposition of penalties or sanctions upon a project 
proponent. First, penalties may be imposed for non-compliance with the legislation. Second, in the 
case of a sequestration offsets project, regulatory sanctions may be imposed where there has been 
reversal of carbon sequestration. The project proponent can be required to relinquish a number of 
ACCUs, failing which a non-compliance penalty will be payable. A carbon maintenance obligation 
may be placed over the project area as a final measure. These regulatory sanctions are explained in 
more detail below.  
 
                                                          
307 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5.  
308 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 27.  
309 Ibid ss 5, 15(2)(b)(i), 27.  
310 Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) ss 61K, 61M, Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 97N; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 87A; Carbon 
Rights Act 2003 (WA) s 8(1); Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) ss  3A, 5; Forestry Rights (Registration) Act 1990 (Tas) s 3; 
Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) s 22.  
311 Michelle Passero, 'The Nature of the Right or Interest Created by a Market for Forest Carbon' (2008) 3 Carbon & Climate 
Law Review 251, 252. The Australian Property Institute also suggests that it’s intended to provide security of tenure: 
Australian Property Institute (NSW and Queensland Divisions), Conceiving Property Rights in Carbon: A Policy Paper 
(2007) 11; see also John Sheehan and Garrick Small, 'Biota and the Problem of Property' (2005) 22 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 158 at 159. 
312 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 27(4)(b). 
313 Ibid pt 9. 
314 Ibid pt 6.  
315 Ibid pts 18, 19. 
61 
 
8.3 Approval of CFI offsets project 
 
The CFI Act provides a rigorous assessment framework for approval of biosequestration offsets 
projects. A biosequestration offsets project must declared an ‘eligible offsets project’ by the Clean 
Energy Regulator. There are a number of requirements for this declaration. First, the project must be 
conducted under a ‘methodology determination’ and comply with its requirements. A methodology 
determination is a legislative instrument setting out eligibility and operational requirements for each 
type of offsets project. For example, there are currently methodology determinations that have been 
approved for environmental plantings, reforestation and afforestation and human-induced 
regeneration of a permanent even-aged native forest.
316
 
Methodology determinations must be endorsed by the Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee and 
comply with the Offsets Integrity Standards set out in the CFI Act. The Standards require emissions 
reductions to meet a specified test of additionality, be measured and capable of verification, and, with 
respect to sequestration projects, provide for adjustments in cyclical levels of sequestration across a 
one-hundred-year period.
317
 The ‘additionality’ test is aimed at ensuring projects will provide 
emissions reductions that are additional to those which would have occurred without the project. The 
test has two parts: the project is not already required under another law, and the project is on the 
‘positive’ list in the Carbon Farming Regulations. The positive list contains projects that are deemed 
to be additional.
318
 When considering activities for inclusion in the positive list, the Minister must 
have regard to the advice of the Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee and consider whether the 
project is ‘not common practice’ in the relevant industry or environment.319 
Second, the project proponent must meet a number of criteria before a declaration of an eligible 
offsets projects can be made. The project proponent must pass the ‘fit and proper person’ test 
including whether he or she has previously breached any relevant legislation.
320
 The project proponent 
must also obtain the legal right to carry out the project and be the registered owner of the ‘applicable 
carbon sequestration right’ over the project area.321 All holders of an eligible interest in the project 
land (such as holders of a mortgage or lease) must consent to the project being carried out on their 
land.
322
 
Finally, the proposed project must not be an excluded offsets project.
323
 This requirement appears to 
be aimed at balancing the benefits of the project in reducing or sequestering emissions with other 
environmental and social impacts of the project.
324
 The Regulations contain a list of excluded offsets 
projects. Projects are excluded on the basis of whether there is a material risk that the project will 
have a material adverse environmental impact on water availability, biodiversity or land access for 
agricultural production, or material adverse social impact on employment or the local community.
325
 
                                                          
316 See above n 301. 
317 Nicola Durrant, ‘Legal Issues in Carbon Farming: Biosequestration, carbon pricing, and carbon rights’ (2011) 2(4) 
Climate Law 515, 524. Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 133 (Offsets Integrity Standards).  
318 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 3.28. 
319 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 41.   
320 Ibid ss 27(4)(f), 64.  
321 Ibid ss 5, 27(4)(e). 
322 Ibid ss 27(4)(k), 44-45A. 
323 Ibid s 56. 
324 Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Bill 2011 (Cth) 1.26-1.33. 
325 Ibid 1.26. 
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Once all of the abovementioned requirements are fulfilled, a declaration of an eligible offsets project 
will be made and the project can commence operation. Other regulatory approvals are likely to be 
necessary for the project under state and federal environmental, planning and water legislation. The 
CFI Act acknowledges this and states that a declaration of an eligible offsets project may be made 
conditional upon all regulatory approvals being obtained for the project before the end of the first 
reporting period.
326
 
 
8.4 Offsets project secured by interest in land 
 
A biosequestration offsets project must sequester carbon in the project area for a minimum of one 
hundred years.
327
 The security of an interest in land will be required to meet this timeframe. 
Consequently, the CFI Act requires the project proponent to hold an ‘applicable carbon sequestration 
right’ over the project area. This is defined as a registered or recorded estate, interest or right that 
confers ‘the exclusive legal right to obtain the benefit (whether present or future) of sequestration of 
carbon in the relevant carbon pool on the area of land’ and runs with the land.328 The requirement to 
hold an applicable carbon sequestration right attempts to take account of the economic consideration 
that viability of the project requires long-term land tenure, and the environmental consideration that 
security of tenure will contribute to the longevity of carbon sequestration.  
An applicable carbon sequestration right will be obtained under state laws. Each Australian state has 
introduced legislation to create a property right over sequestered carbon in trees, forests and 
vegetation.
329
 These rights are separate from ownership of the land and ownership of the trees, forests 
or vegetation upon the land. They will be referred to collectively as ‘carbon sequestration rights’. 
Most state carbon sequestration legislation was enacted prior to the introduction of the Carbon 
Farming Initiative, but a state carbon sequestration right will be used to underpin a biosequestration 
offsets project. Although state carbon sequestration rights are all specified in slightly different terms 
to the Commonwealth definition, it appears that these rights will be sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the CFI Act.
330
  
A carbon sequestration right is an interest in land
331
 but its incidents are not fully established. State 
legislation generally provides that a carbon sequestration right confers ‘the right to the economic 
benefit of carbon sequestration’ which will allow the holder of the right to claim ACCUs for the 
sequestered carbon. No other incidents of a carbon sequestration right are specified in legislation. 
However, there will generally be an agreement underpinning the sale of carbon sequestration rights to 
a project proponent that sets out the incidents of the right (‘carbon sequestration agreement’).  
                                                          
326 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 28. 
327 Ibid s 87. 
328 Ibid s 43. 
329 See Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 87A, 88AB; Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) pt 6 and Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) pt 6, div 
4C; Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 5; Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990 (Tas) ss 3, 5; Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) 
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Approach to Carbon Sequestration Rights under the Victorian Climate Change Act 2010’ (2011) 26(6) Australian 
Environment Review 158, 160. 
331 This is not explicitly specified in South Australia where a carbon sequestration right is deemed to be a profit à prendre for 
the purposes of transactions conducted under the relevant land titles legislation: Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 12. 
However a profit à prendre is an interest in land.  
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A carbon sequestration agreement is specifically authorised by legislation in Victoria, New South 
Wales, Western Australia and Tasmania.
332
 All four States distinguish between a carbon sequestration 
right and the associated carbon sequestration agreement. Queensland and South Australian legislation 
do not make this distinction. In South Australia, the carbon sequestration agreement itself constitutes 
the carbon sequestration right.
333
 There is no statutory provision for a carbon sequestration agreement 
in Queensland, but an agreement may be attached as a schedule to the land titles form creating the 
carbon sequestration right.
334
 The following table illustrates the different legislative structures 
between States: 
State 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Right 
Carbon Sequestration 
Agreement 
Interest in Land? 
Queensland 
 
Carbon abatement 
interest 
 
There is no legislative 
associated contract or 
covenant.  
A carbon abatement 
interest is an interest in 
land.
335
 
Victoria 
Carbon 
sequestration right 
 
A forestry and carbon 
management agreement 
can be recorded on the 
land title register and 
will run with the land.
336
 
A carbon sequestration 
right is an interest in 
land.
337
 A forestry and 
carbon management 
agreement is not. 
New South 
Wales 
Carbon 
sequestration right 
 
A forestry covenant can 
be recorded on the land 
title register and will run 
with the land.
338
 
A carbon sequestration 
right is deemed to be a 
profit à prendre
339
 and 
therefore an interest in 
land. A forestry covenant 
is an interest in land 
within the meaning of 
section 42 of the Real 
Property Act 1900.
340
 
Western 
Australia 
Carbon right 
 
A carbon covenant is an 
agreement that can be 
registered on the land 
title register and will run 
with the land.
341
 
 
A carbon right and a 
carbon covenant are both 
interests in land.
342
 
South Forest property There is no legislative A forest property (carbon 
                                                          
332 Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) s 27; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 87A; Forestry Rights (Registration) Act 1990 
(Tas) s 3; Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA) pt 3; Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 5. 
333 Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) ss 5, 6. 
334 Queensland Government, Land Registry Forms, Form 36 Carbon Abatement Interest, item 6 
<http://www.derm.qld.gov.au/property/titles/forms.html>. 
335 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 97N. 
336 Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) ss 27, 28, 33. 
337 Ibid s 25(1). 
338 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 87A, 88EA(5); Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42. 
339 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 88AB. 
340 Once recorded on the register: Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 88EA(5). 
341 Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA) s 12. 
342 Ibid ss 6, 12. 
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Australia (carbon rights) 
agreement  
 
associated contract or 
covenant. The 
agreement itself 
constitutes the carbon 
sequestration right.  
rights) agreement is not 
expressly classified as an 
interest in the land.
343
 
Tasmania 
Carbon 
sequestration right 
 
A forestry covenant can 
be registered on the land 
title register and will 
bind future 
landowners.
344
 
A carbon sequestration 
right is an interest in the 
land.
345
 A forestry 
covenant is not an interest 
in the land. 
 
The above table illustrates the basic structure of a carbon sequestration right and associated carbon 
sequestration agreement. State legislation contains minimal guidance on the required or permitted 
contents of a carbon sequestration agreement. Parties are granted significant freedom to transact on 
their own terms, although the contents of a carbon sequestration agreement will be guided by relevant 
state and federal legislation.
346
 State legislation also does not address the enforceability of a carbon 
sequestration agreement against third parties who may have dealings with the land during the 
timeframe of the project.  
 
8.5 Enforcement by Clean Energy Regulator 
 
The CFI Act grants powers to the Regulator to ensure the longevity of carbon sequestered in the 
project area. This is necessary because sequestered carbon is vulnerable to disturbance from land 
clearing and events such as fire, pest attack, disease or decay.
347
 These events may result in a release 
of sequestered carbon back to the atmosphere. However, an ACCU represents one tonne of carbon 
dioxide that must remain permanently sequestered in the project area for a minimum of one hundred 
years.
348
 The CFI Act attempts to ensure the permanent sequestration of carbon in a biosequestration 
offsets project through several mechanisms.  
First, a ‘relinquishment requirement’ will be imposed upon the project proponent in certain 
circumstances where has been a significant reversal of carbon sequestration.
349
 This will require the 
project proponent to surrender a certain number of ACCUs to the Clean Energy Regulator.  
Secondly, a relinquishment requirement can be imposed if the reversal of carbon sequestration is not 
attributable to natural disturbance, reasonable actions taken to reduce the risk of bushfire, or conduct 
of a third party which the project proponent could not reasonably control.  
                                                          
343 However a forest property agreement is deemed to be a profit à prendre for the purposes of transactions conducted under 
the relevant land titles legislation: Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 12. 
344 Forestry Rights (Registration) Act 1990 (Tas) ss 3, 6.  
345 Ibid s 3. 
346 Including relevant state carbon sequestration legislation, the Carbon Farming Act and Regulations, and any applicable 
methodology determination. 
347 Steven Kennett, ‘Carbon Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol: Legal and policy mechanisms for domestic implementation’ 
(2003) 21(3) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 252, 253. 
348 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 87.  
349 Ibid ss 87-91 regarding relinquishment requirements. 
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Thirdly, it may be imposed where the reversal is due to natural disturbance or conduct of a third party 
which the project proponent could not reasonably control, and the project proponent has not taken 
reasonable steps to mitigate the damage. 
Finally, a relinquishment requirement can be imposed if false or misleading information has been 
given in connection with the project, or the declaration of an eligible offsets project has been revoked.  
The declaration of an eligible offsets project may be revoked if the project proponent becomes 
insolvent, breaches certain legislation, or ceases to hold the application carbon sequestration right.
350
 
Overall there are a wide range of circumstances in which a relinquishment requirement may be 
imposed. 
If this requirement is not complied with within 90 days, a ‘carbon maintenance obligation’ may be 
imposed over the project area.
351
 This will prevent the landowner or any other person from engaging 
in activity that will result in a reduction below the ‘benchmark carbon sequestration level’, which is 
the amount of tonnes of carbon stored in the project area at the time the carbon maintenance 
obligation was declared. If there is a reduction below the benchmark carbon sequestration level, the 
landowner will have a positive obligation to take all reasonable steps to restore the sequestered carbon 
to the benchmark level. A carbon maintenance obligation will also prohibit the landowner or any 
other person from engaging in any activity that is not a ‘permitted carbon activity’. Imposition of a 
carbon maintenance obligation will place a large burden on the landowner and significantly reduce the 
marketability of the land. The carbon maintenance obligation will continue in force for one hundred 
years after the first ACCUs were issued for the project, unless a non-relinquishment penalty is paid.
352
 
Alternatively, the total amount of ACCUs issued for the project can be surrendered and the carbon 
maintenance obligation will be removed.
353
 Both options for removal of a carbon maintenance 
obligation will prove expensive.  
 
8.6 Link between ACCUs and the carbon pool 
The CFI Act sets out strict requirements for measuring and calculating sequestered carbon for the 
issue of ACCUs. The project proponent can apply for a certificate of entitlement and once granted, the 
Clean Energy Regulator must issue the number of Australian Carbon Credit Units specified in the 
certificate to its holder.
354
 Applications for a certificate of entitlement can be made at regular time 
intervals, from annually to once every five years.
355 An application for a certificate of entitlement 
must contain information necessary to calculate the total amount of carbon sequestered by the 
project.
356 This will require a project proponent to monitor the project and take measurements in order 
to gather information on the amount of carbon sequestered. Furthermore, the applicable methodology 
determination may require the project proponent to monitor the project for events of disturbance.
357
 
                                                          
350 Ibid ss 36, 37, 65. 
351 Ibid ss 90(4), 91(4), 97 regarding carbon maintenance obligations. 
352 Ibid s 97(14). 
353 Ibid s 99.  
354 Ibid ss 11-15. 
355 Ibid s 76. 
356 Ibid ss 12, 13. Information in the application for a certificate of entitlement must include all of the calculations used to 
determine the carbon dioxide equivalent net abatement amount for the project: Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) 
Act 2011 (Cth) ss 13, 76(4); Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011 (Cth) reg 6.2(e). 
357 See for example, Carbon Farming (Quantifying Carbon Sequestration by Permanent Environmental Plantings of Native 
Tree Species using the CFI Reforestation Modelling Tool) Methodology Determination 2012 (Cth) s 4.3.  
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Remote sensory or satellite imagery can be used to monitor a project
358 but this may not always be 
possible. It is likely that a project proponent will require access to the project area and rights to 
monitor the project and conduct measurements of sequestered carbon.  
The general principle is that a project proponent will be issued with one ACCU for each tonne of 
carbon sequestered by the carbon pool. However, a risk of reversal buffer will be applied to the 
amount of ACCUs initially issued for a sequestration offsets project.
359
 This means that the amount of 
Australian Carbon Credit Units issued will be 5% less than the total amount of carbon sequestered. 
The risk of reversal buffer is designed to ‘insure the scheme’ against losses of sequestered carbon.360 
This is necessary due to the tenuous link between the carbon pool and the ACCUs once issued.   
The CFI Act distinguishes between the carbon sequestration right, which is the registered real 
property right used to support a biosequestration project, and the ACCU, which is personal property. 
Distinguishing between the two types of right allows ACCUs to be freely traded on the market 
separately from the carbon sequestration right. ACCUs are initially issued to the project proponent 
who holds the carbon sequestration right, but the credits can then be aggregated or disaggregated and 
traded on the market separately from the carbon sequestration right. After the first transaction, credits 
will pass to a third party who has no proprietary or contractual rights to the land upon which the 
biosequestration offsets project is conducted, and hence no legal means of ensuring that carbon 
remains sequestered on the land. If there is a reversal of sequestration, the result may be a ‘black hole’ 
where an ACCU is traded on the market purporting to represent permanent sequestration of emissions 
in circumstances where the sequestration is no longer effective. To avoid this situation, the CFI Act 
imposes regulatory sanctions to ensure permanent sequestration of carbon in the project area. These 
regulatory sanctions include relinquishment requirements and carbon maintenance obligations. 
However, the CFI Act allows for regulatory sanctions to be removed upon payment of a financial 
penalty.
361
  
 
8.7 Critique of the legal framework for biosequestration 
Australia’s legal regime for biosequestration is well advanced in comparison to international 
jurisdictions.
362
 The CFI Act provides a comprehensive legal framework for the approval, operation 
and enforcement of biosequestration projects. State laws are sufficient to provide the minimal 
structure of a real property right that can be used to underpin biosequestration projects. However, 
there are a number of discrete issues which have been identified with the current legislative regime.   
 
8.7.1 Underspecification of state carbon sequestration rights 
A biosequestration offsets project must be underpinned by a carbon sequestration right gained under 
state law. The carbon sequestration right will need to grant sufficient rights to enable the project 
proponent to fulfil their responsibilities under the CFI Act. These responsibilities will include 
monitoring the biosequestration offsets project and taking measurements of the sequestered carbon. 
                                                          
358 Ibid. 
359 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 16. 
360 Explanatory Memorandum, Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Bill 2011 (Cth) 68. 
361 See Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) ss 97(14), 179. 
362 See Steven Kennett, Arlene Kwasniak and Alastair Lucas, ‘Property Rights and the Legal Framework for Carbon 
Sequestration on Agricultural Land’ (2005-2006) 37 Ottawa Law Review 171, 197, 205, 208-9; Maron Greenleaf, ‘Using 
Carbon Rights to Curb Deforestation and Empower Forest Communities’ (2011) 18 New York University Environmental 
Law Journal 507, 556. 
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This is likely to require access to the project area. Furthermore, a project proponent will be held 
responsible in the first instance for ensuring permanence of sequestered carbon. The proponent must 
have some measure of control over the project area in order to manage, maintain and ensure the 
permanence of sequestered carbon. Rights of access, monitoring, management and maintenance of the 
carbon pool are not conferred on a project proponent under the CFI Act or the state carbon 
sequestration legislation.  
Currently, the only incident of a state carbon sequestration right is the ‘right to the benefit of carbon 
sequestration on land’ (or similar).363 ‘The right to the benefit of carbon sequestration’ allows the 
holder to claim ACCUs for carbon sequestered on the land but does not allow him or her to ensure the 
permanence of the sequestered carbon. The creation of an interest in land without specifying any of its 
essential incidents, apart from the right to claim ACCUs, is wholly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, 
carbon sequestration rights that are conceptualised purely in terms of rights do not contemplate the 
responsibilities that a holder of the right must fulfil under the CFI Act. Mandatory incidents of a 
carbon sequestration right should be set out in state legislation including rights of control over the 
carbon pool to enhance and maintain carbon sequestration, rights of access to the land and rights to 
monitor and take measurements of sequestered carbon. These rights could fall along a wide spectrum, 
subject to negotiation between the parties. 
A number of other incidents of a carbon sequestration right are underspecified by state legislation. 
This is problematic because an interest in land should be properly defined and specified, including 
rules for its mode of creation, recording or registration, transfer, enforcement, priority, termination 
and extinguishment. State carbon sequestration legislation does not address a number of these matters 
including grounds for termination, procedure upon default and removal of a carbon sequestration right 
(and associated agreement) from the land title register. A carbon sequestration right is an interest in 
land and therefore its termination may bring about a range of consequences under established property 
law doctrines.
364
 Termination of a carbon sequestration right may also lead to other consequences 
such as a relinquishment requirement under the CFI Act.
365
 Consequently, matters surrounding 
default, termination and removal from the land title register should be comprehensively addressed in 
state legislation. 
Due to the under specification of state carbon sequestration rights, the associated carbon sequestration 
agreement will become the main source of rights and obligations for a landowner and project 
proponent conducting a biosequestration offsets project. A carbon sequestration agreement will 
presumably deal with matters including access to the project area, control, management and 
maintenance of the carbon pool, default, termination of the carbon sequestration right, and dealings 
with the land and the right. These essential matters will be determined by the contents of each 
individual carbon sequestration agreement, creating significant uncertainty and transaction costs for 
third parties who wish to assess the scope and attributes of a carbon sequestration right.
366
 A carbon 
sequestration agreement will be registered or recorded on the land title register, but this merely brings 
it to the attention of third parties such as prospective purchasers of the land. Registration or recording 
does not remove the need to assess the meaning and effect of a carbon sequestration agreement.  
                                                          
363 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 97N; Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) s 22; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 87A; Carbon 
Rights Act 2003 (WA) s 8(1); Forestry Rights (Registration) Act 1990 (Tas) s 3; Forest Property Act 2000 (SA) s 3A(1). 
364 For example, relief against forfeiture: see Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691 at 725; Legione v Hateley (1983) 
152 CLR 406. 
365 Once the project proponent ceases to hold the carbon sequestration right, the declaration of an eligible offsets project may 
be revoked leading to a requirement to relinquish a certain number of Australian Carbon Credit Units.  
366 See further Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, 'Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The numerus clausus 
principle' (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1, 26-30. 
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The enforceability of a carbon sequestration right and agreement against third parties is also 
underspecified by state legislation. A carbon sequestration right is an interest in land and will 
therefore be enforceable by and against any successive landowner or holder of the right. The 
enforceability of a registered or recorded carbon sequestration agreement against a successive 
landowner is a more complicated issue. The agreement is generally recorded or registered on the land 
title register,
367
 but the legal effect of recording novel rights such as carbon sequestration agreements 
on the land title register is not fully established.
368
 However, it is clear that enforceability of a carbon 
sequestration agreement against third parties will be restricted to terms that are within the scope, 
subject matter and purpose of the authorising Act. Determining the implied legislative limits of a 
carbon sequestration agreement, and whether a particular term exceeds them, will require an exercise 
in statutory interpretation. It would be preferable for state carbon sequestration legislation to clarify 
the extent of a carbon sequestration agreement’s enforceability against third parties.  
 
8.7.2 Carbon maintenance obligations over private land 
The CFI Act implements the carbon maintenance obligation as a mechanism to ensure the 
permanence of sequestered carbon. A carbon maintenance obligation places a large burden upon the 
land by restricting land use activities, lowering the marketability of land and requiring a financial 
penalty to be paid for its removal.
369
 The carbon maintenance obligation attaches to the land and 
effectively places liability upon the landowner or occupier. The only legal basis for imposition of a 
carbon maintenance obligation is the written consent of the landowner required as part of the project 
proponent’s application for declaration of an eligible offsets project. The landowner is required to 
provide a ‘representation and warranty’ that he or she understands that a carbon maintenance 
obligation may be placed over the project land.
370
 It is unclear whether this written consent will 
translate into consent to the severe restrictions on land use that a carbon maintenance obligation may 
impose, particularly in light of the state provisions on indefeasibility of title.
371
 Furthermore, the land 
may be transferred during the term of the project. There is no requirement for a successive landowner 
to provide any form of consent to the project or the imposition of a carbon maintenance obligation.  
The CFI Act requires that a carbon maintenance obligation must be recorded as part of the project 
details within the Register of Offsets Projects kept by the Clean Energy Regulator.
372
 This is a federal 
register without any connection to state land title registers. However, the CFI Act states that a carbon 
maintenance obligation ‘may’ be noted on the land title register.373 This notation is discretionary and 
may not occur in the absence of state legislation requiring a carbon maintenance obligation to be 
noted on the land title register. Failure to record a carbon maintenance obligation on the land title 
register may result in purchasers of land acquiring their interest unaware that it is subject to 
responsibilities imposed under the CFI Act.  
                                                          
367 Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic) ss 27, 28, 33; Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) ss 87A, 88EA(5); Carbon Rights Act 2003 
(WA) s 12; Forestry Rights (Registration) Act 1990 (Tas) ss 3, 6. 
368 See Samantha Hepburn, ‘Carbon Rights as New Property: The benefits of statutory verification’ (2009) 39 Sydney Law 
Review 239, 251-2, 264-9 regarding the effect of recording a Western Australian carbon right. 
369 See Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) ss 97(14)(a),(b), 99, 179.  
370 Pursuant to the standard consent form: Clean Energy Regulator, Carbon Farming Initiative: Eligible Interest Holder 
Consent (Australian Government, 2012) s 10 <http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Farming-Initiative/Forms-
and-calculators/Documents/Eligible%20Interest%20Holder%20Consent.pdf>. 
371 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 184; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42; Real 
Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 68, 69; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) ss 39, 40; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68. Note that 
Commonwealth legislation prevails over State legislation to the extent of any inconsistency: Commonwealth Constitution s 
109. 
372 Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 168(1)(n). 
373 Ibid s 40. 
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8.7.3 The surrender of ACCUs under the carbon pricing mechanism  
The carbon pricing mechanism allows a liable entity to use ACCUs from biosequestration offsets 
projects to meet their surrender obligations.
374
 Each ACCU represents one tonne of carbon dioxide 
sequestered by a biosequestration offsets project that will offset one tonne of the liable entity’s 
emissions. Carbon dioxide must remain permanently sequestered in the project area in order to 
effectively offset a liable entity’s emissions. However, there is no overriding duty placed on project 
proponents under the CFI Act to ensure that carbon stocks remain permanently sequestered. If carbon 
sequestration is reversed, project proponents have the option to pay a financial penalty instead of 
restoring sequestration levels.
375
 Payment of this penalty will not address the lost levels of carbon 
sequestration. Consequently, ACCUs surrendered under the carbon pricing mechanism may not 
represent permanent reduction of emissions where carbon sequestration is reversed and no action is 
taken to restore the carbon pool. This may affect the environmental effectiveness of both the carbon 
farming initiative and the carbon pricing mechanism. 
8.8 Conclusions and Recommendations  
The current legal framework for biosequestration attempts to strike a delicate balance between 
environmental, economic and social considerations. The environmental requirement of ensuring 
permanent sequestration of carbon must be balanced against the economic impacts of imposing long-
term restrictions on land. Principles of ESD require that these considerations be properly integrated 
into the decision-making and compliance framework established under the CFI Act. A number of 
legislative reforms may be necessary to achieve this. The following reforms are recommended:  
 State carbon sequestration rights should be defined in functional terms to confer essential 
rights of control, management, maintenance, access and monitoring. These rights will enable 
the holder to fulfil its responsibilities as a project proponent under the CFI Act.  
 Carbon sequestration rights should be properly specified by state legislation. Specification 
should include grounds for termination of the right, procedure upon default, removal of the 
right from the land title register, assignment of a carbon sequestration right, and enforceability 
of a carbon sequestration right and associated agreement against third parties. 
 The definition and incidents of a carbon sequestration right should be uniform across all states 
in order to simplify projects that cross state borders and facilitate international investment by 
providing a simpler regime for investors to navigate.   
 A stronger legal basis is needed for the imposition of a carbon maintenance obligation upon 
private land. The standard Carbon Farming Initiative consent form may not be sufficient. 
 Further consideration should be given to the surrender of ACCUs under the carbon pricing 
mechanism. Additional legal mechanisms may be necessary to ensure that ACCUs are not 
purporting to provide a permanent offset of a liable entity’s emissions where carbon 
sequestration has been reversed.  
 
 
  
                                                          
374 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 5 (definition of ‘eligible emissions unit’). 
375 See Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) s 179. 
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9. Recommendations 
 
The four legislative case studies have resulted in specific findings and recommendations. There are 
also a number of common findings across different stages of the carbon cycle that illustrate the overall 
strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory framework governing the carbon cycle.   
A list of specific recommendations has been made arising from the common findings.   
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 1: INTEGRATION OF THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF ESD  
 
The concept and principles of ESD should be integrated into legislation governing all stages of the 
carbon cycle. ESD principles should be clearly set out in the objects of legislation and integrated into 
the approval processes for projects across the carbon cycle. Legislation should mandate consideration 
of economic, social and environmental factors for approval of activities with the potential to cause 
environmental harm. Legislative requirements to consider and address greenhouse gas emissions from 
mining, petroleum and electricity projects will also be necessary to ensure ESD.  
 
 
The concept of ESD and its principles such as the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle 
and the integration of environmental, economic and social considerations into decision-making 
processes are central to a sustainable legal regime for the carbon cycle. Integration of the concept and 
principles of ESD must go beyond an acknowledgment of ecologically sustainable development in the 
objects of legislation. A portfolio of legal instruments will be necessary to ensure activities that are 
emissions-intensive or carry the risk of environmental harm are conducted in an ecologically 
sustainable manner. First, legislative provisions must require comprehensive assessment of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts of a proposed project as part of the decision-making 
process. This should include consideration of the environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions 
from emissions-intensive projects. 
 
Current environmental and planning laws vest the decision-maker with a wide scope of discretion and 
can therefore result in outcomes that disregard greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental 
impacts. To rectify this, specific legal obligations should be placed upon decision-makers to consider 
and address greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts. An example can be found in 
section 14 of the Climate Change Act 2010 (Vic). This section requires a decision-maker to consider a 
proposed project’s greenhouse gas emissions, including potential cumulative impacts of greenhouse 
gas emissions, and was applied in a recent Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal decision 
which considered and addressed greenhouse gas decisions from a proposed power station.
376
  
Integration of the polluter pays principle within the legislative framework will require greater 
responsibilities to be placed upon the project proponent for emissions-intensive activities, such as 
mining, petroleum extraction and coal-fired electricity generation. Responsibilities could be placed 
upon project proponents through the imposition of conditions of approval requiring reduction or 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. This form of condition of approval has rarely been imposed 
upon projects for the extraction and transformation of carbon, although it appears these conditions are 
                                                          
376 See Dual Gas Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Agency [2012] VCAT 308 at [241]-[246].  
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becoming more common.
377
 Conditions imposed to date are likely to require the project proponent to 
implement all reasonable and feasible measures to minimise the release of greenhouse gas 
emissions,
378
 or to prepare and implement a plan to manage or abate greenhouse gas emissions.
379
 
Conditions requiring quantitative reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions are seldom 
imposed,
380
 and recent case authority indicates that mitigation conditions will be considered 
unnecessary due to the introduction of the carbon pricing mechanism.
381
  
 
Ideally, nationally consistent conditions of approval
382
 requiring reduction or mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emissions should be imposed upon projects for the extraction and transformation of carbon, in a 
manner that does not conflict with the carbon pricing mechanism.
383
 For example, conditions 
requiring emissions intensity standards and CCS-ready standards could be imposed upon new coal-
fired electricity generation. These conditions would not conflict with the carbon pricing mechanism 
and should be imposed as a ‘safety net’ until there is a mature carbon market established in 
Australia.
384
  
 
It is noted that the recently introduced carbon pricing mechanism places financial responsibility upon 
liable entities for carbon emissions. However, this responsibility is substantially alleviated through the 
provision of transition assistance to coal-fired electricity generators and the coal mining sector. The 
future of the carbon pricing mechanism beyond 2013 is also uncertain.  
 
  
                                                          
377 See Dual Gas Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Agency [2012] VCAT 308. The Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal imposed a condition upon approval of a demonstration plant for coal gasification technology requiring that the 
federal Government enter into contracts for closure of at least 600MWe of coal-fired electricity generation in Victoria by 
2020 before construction of the plant could commence. The subsequent failure of the Commonwealth Government’s 
Contract for Closure negotiations casts significant uncertainty on the future of this project. The VCAT also imposed 
conditions requiring an emissions intensity standard of 0.8 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted per MWh of electricity 
generated, and that the project be CCS-ready. See also Lester v Minister for Planning and Ashton Coal Operations Pty Ltd 
[2011] NSWLEC 213 at [31]; Hunter Environment Lobby Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 221. 
378 Lester v Minister for Planning and Ashton Coal Operations Pty Ltd [2011] NSWLEC 213 at [31]; Hunter Environment 
Lobby Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 221 at [35], [36]. 
379 Haughton v Minister for Planning and Macquarie Generation; Haughton v Minister for Planning and TRUenergy Pty Ltd 
[2011] NSWLEC 217 at [39], [40].  
380 For example, in Xstrata Coal Qld Pty Ltd v Friends of the Earth [2012] QLC 13, the Coordinator-General did not 
consider it reasonable to impose a definitive offset condition on the project. Although the Coordinator-General 
recommended conditions for a greenhouse gas reduction management plan, there were ultimately no conditions in the draft 
environmental authority dealing with greenhouse gas emissions or climate change: at [506]- [508].   
381 Hunter Environment Lobby Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 40 at [16]. 
382 See Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd [2007] QLRT 33 at [23] where it was observed that ‘absent universally applied 
policies for greenhouse gas reduction, requiring this mine (and no others) to limit or reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
would be arbitrary and unfair’. 
383 This potential difficulty was identified in Hunter Environment Lobby Inc v Minister for Planning (No 2) [2012] 
NSWLEC 40 which held that conditions requiring offset of greenhouse gas emissions should not be imposed because the 
carbon pricing mechanism scheme, together with the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) and 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth), meets at a practical level the purpose of imposing a condition 
requiring the offsetting of scope 1 greenhouse gas emissions: at 16.  
384 Dual Gas Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Agency [2012] VCAT 308 at [349], [352]. 
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RECOMMENDATION 2: INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND STATE 
POLICIES AND LAWS  
 
(i) Integration of laws for the carbon cycle will result in greater emissions reductions and more 
sustainable environmental outcomes. International, national and state climate change and 
environmental policy and legislation should be integrated to provide interoperability of laws at all 
stages of the carbon cycle.  
 
(ii) State laws should also be integrated to ensure that nationally consistent legal standards exist for 
sequestration projects.  
(iii) Legal instruments such as the carbon pricing mechanism must be designed to work together with 
other regulatory schemes.   
 
Fragmentation is a legal and institutional challenge which must be addressed in order to create an 
integrated and coherent legal regime for the sustainable use of carbon. There must be an integrated 
portfolio of laws designed to achieve the overall purposes of a legal regime for the carbon cycle. 
Separate, non-complementary laws that do not work together or even contradict each other will not 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions or produce environmentally sustainable outcomes.  
 
First, there must be integration to ensure that legal frameworks are consistent between jurisdictions.  
Currently there is fragmentation between regulation of particular activities or rights in different 
jurisdictions. For example, legislation in each state deals differently with the definition and incidents 
of a carbon sequestration right, the structure of a carbon sequestration right and its associated 
agreement, and a carbon sequestration agreement’s registration and enforceability against third 
parties. This has resulted in six different forms of carbon sequestration right throughout Australia, 
each of which can be used to underpin a biosequestration offsets project conducted under the Carbon 
Farming Act. There is also fragmentation between the rights conferred upon the holder of a carbon 
sequestration right under state legislation, and the responsibilities imposed upon a project proponent 
by the Carbon Farming Act. State and Commonwealth laws must be designed to work together to 
ensure effective operation of biosequestration projects.   
State and Commonwealth legal frameworks for carbon capture and storage projects are also 
fragmented in a number of respects. There are different provisions in each jurisdiction regarding 
ownership of components of a carbon capture and storage project and long-term liability for the 
project. Nationally consistent standards regarding the treatment of long-term liability for carbon 
capture and storage projects should be a priority for legislative reform. 
There should be integration to ensure that legal instruments work consistently as a single instrument 
or in conjunction with other regulatory schemes. Regulation of all stages of the carbon cycle must 
work together to ensure that comprehensive liability is imposed for carbon emissions across the cycle 
and that carbon remains permanently sequestered. There are several instances of fragmentation 
between the carbon pricing mechanism and other regulatory schemes. ACCUs purporting to represent 
permanent sequestration of carbon emissions can be surrendered under the carbon pricing mechanism, 
yet the Carbon Farming Act allows for the payment of a financial penalty to release a project 
proponent from liability if carbon sequestration is reversed. The actual reversal of carbon 
sequestration resulting in a non-credible ACCU is not addressed through either the carbon pricing 
74 
 
mechanism or the Carbon Farming Act. Another example is the use of geosequestration projects to 
store carbon emissions that would otherwise be covered by the carbon pricing mechanism. A liable 
entity can reduce their reported emissions by the amount that is sent off for permanent storage, but the 
carbon pricing mechanism does not impose liability for any subsequent leakage of permanently stored 
carbon dioxide.  
Fragmentation can also be found within the carbon pricing mechanism itself. One Part of the Clean 
Energy Act 2011 (Cth) imposes liability to surrender carbon units upon coal-fired electricity 
generators, while another Part provides transitional assistance in the form of free carbon units to coal-
fired electricity generators. Transitional assistance is also provided to a number of other sectors that 
are liable to surrender carbon units such as the coal mining sector, the steel industry and other 
emissions-intensive trade exposed industries.
385
 The internal fragmentation created by provision of 
transitional assistance will ultimately hinder the effective operation of the carbon pricing mechanism. 
 
Finally, there is a potential fragmentation between Australian and international legal requirements for 
creation of offset credits from biosequestration and geosequestration projects. For example, the 
Carbon Farming Act (Cth) uses a ‘positive’ list to satisfy additionality requirements for 
biosequestration projects while the Kyoto Protocol rules for biosequestration projects require a more 
complex additionality test to be satisfied. The fragmentation between Australian and international 
offset regimes may have consequences in terms of the ability to surrender ACCUs as eligible offset 
credits under the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol regime and other linked international carbon markets.  
Challenges to integration of the legal regime for the carbon cycle may arise from the federal 
constitutional system that operates in Australia. The Commonwealth has limited legislative power to 
enact laws regulating land use and environmental matters, although several heads of constitutional 
legislative power could potentially be used to support environmental legislation.
386
 Integration of laws 
for the carbon cycle therefore becomes dependent upon the willingness of the states to co-operate with 
the Commonwealth and each other. This may not be feasible in the current political environment.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 3: RIGHTS TO CARBON MUST BE CLEAR AND FULLY 
SPECIFIED 
 
When new forms of carbon rights are created, these rights should be fully specified by statute. Neither 
traditional categories of property nor statutory agreements are an adequate source for specifying 
carbon rights. Traditional rules of property and land ownership are not flexible enough and statutory 
agreements are too variable. Legislation must clarify ownership and rights to access, extract, 
transform and sequester all forms of carbon. 
A coherent set of rights to access, manage and control carbon in all its forms is essential for an 
integrated legal regime for the carbon cycle. All new property rights must be clear, stable, secure, and 
                                                          
385 As well as the Energy Security Fund, transitional assistance includes the $983 million Coal Sector Jobs Package, $8.6 
billion Jobs and Competitiveness Program and $300 million Steel Transformation Plan: Australian Government, Assistance 
for industry (Clean Energy Future, 2013) <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/helping-business/assistance-for-industry-
2/>. 
386 Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxix) (‘external affairs power’) could be used to implement obligations in the Kyoto 
Protocol and the UNFCCC; s 51(xx) could be used to regulate trading and financial corporations. The federal government 
may also enact legislation on a subject matter not within the list of enumerated powers if all of the concerned States consent 
to it (Commonwealth Constitution s 51(xxxvii)). 
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fully defined and specified.
387
 Clear and stable rights to carbon will assist in encouraging the uptake of 
sequestration projects and addressing liabilities for losses of sequestered carbon. New rights to carbon 
must also integrate with the large body of pre-existing property law in Australia, including established 
property rights such as ownership of private land, mortgages, leases and easements.  
 
The traditional system of private land use and ownership is inadequate to clarify rights to carbon in its 
different forms. Originally this was evident from the classification of carbon sequestration rights as a 
‘profit a prendre’ despite numerous conceptual difficulties surrounding this classification. Traditional 
property law doctrines are also inadequate to specify ownership of components of a geological 
sequestration project. Carbon capture and storage legislation does not address ownership of carbon 
dioxide during injection into underground formations and throughout the life of the project. This may 
lead to the application of the ill-fitting doctrine of fixtures and chattels to determine who owns 
sequestered carbon dioxide in the underground storage formation. Another example is the failure to 
specify the enforceability of long-term statutory agreements against third parties. This may lead to the 
application of established rules for covenants running with the land and provisions regarding 
indefeasible title. However, traditional land and property laws are not flexible enough to 
accommodate new forms of rights and activities. Their application will not result in legal clarity but 
instead add another layer of complexity for parties attempting to discern their rights and obligations 
relating to land.  
 
The use of statutory agreements to define and specify new forms of rights to carbon is also 
inadequate. There is a common trend of using statutory agreements between private parties to 
facilitate biosequestration projects, and access to land for coal mining and coal seam gas extraction 
activities. Statutory agreements are poorly defined by statute and their terms are variable between 
transactions. The use of statutory agreements to create and specify rights to carbon will result in 
widespread inconsistencies and increase transaction costs for third parties dealing with the land.  
  
To rectify these issues, there must be full legislative specification of ownership, obligations and 
liabilities surrounding new forms of rights and activities. Legislation must clearly set out ownership of 
different components of a biosequestration or geosequestration project. In particular the subject matter 
of a carbon sequestration right should be defined, and its incidents fully specified. Consideration 
should be given to amending greenhouse gas storage legislation to provide more secure and stable 
rights under an injection lease or licence. This must be balanced with the public interest in preventing 
harm from leakage of stored carbon dioxide.  
 
Other miscellaneous issues surrounding rights to carbon must also be addressed, such as the property 
law implications of imposing a carbon maintenance obligation on private land under the Carbon 
Farming Act. There may also need to be further specification of carbon units and Australian Carbon 
Credit Units as ‘personal property’. In particular, treatment of these units under state property law 
regimes must be addressed.  
 
 
 
                                                          
387 See Lord Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1251-52: ‘Before a right or an interest 
in land can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be definable, identifiable by 
third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties and have some degree of permanence or stability’. 
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RECOMMENDATION 4: INTEGRATION OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
 
The use of an adaptive management approach may be effective to govern activities with a high risk of 
environmental harm. Government policy for adaptive management must be integrated into the 
legislative framework. Regulators must have comprehensive powers to respond to emerging 
information about environmental impacts and harm, including powers to suspend or cancel projects. 
 
For an adaptive management approach to regulating environmental impacts to be effective, it must be 
integrated into the legislative framework. Legislation must define the parameters of the adaptive 
management approach, including key objectives and indicators of environmental harm, a range of 
regulatory powers to respond to emerging information on environmental impacts, and thresholds for 
taking action. Current Queensland regulation places a number of reporting, monitoring and 
notification requirements upon project proponents as a method of addressing the environmental 
impacts of coal seam gas projects. Apart from the ‘make good’ obligation imposed upon project 
proponents to address groundwater impacts, there is minimal legislative scope for regulatory 
responses to emerging information about adverse environmental impacts. Legislative reform is 
required to implement a true adaptive management approach to regulation of coal seam gas projects.  
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 5: MANAGING THE INFORMATION COSTS OF NEW PROPERTY 
Transparency of rights to carbon is necessary to facilitate dealings and reduce information costs. All 
forms of statutory agreements expressed to bind successors in title should be recorded and searchable 
through the land information system available to the public, and a mechanism introduced for 
prospective purchasers, mortgagees and lessees to obtain a copy. Likewise restrictions attaching to a 
landowner’s title, such as under the Carbon Farming Act should be recorded on the land title register 
or land information system. Consideration should be given to the role of the land title register in 
making interests in land and restrictions arising from carbon rights publicly available. 
 
New forms of rights to carbon including carbon sequestration rights, carbon sequestration agreements, 
access agreements and conduct and compensation agreements should be transparent. Currently, 
legislation provides that statutory agreements ‘run with the land’ and are enforceable against third 
parties such as successive landowners. The scope and content of statutory agreements is generally 
poorly defined, granting parties a large degree of freedom to insert their own terms. There is 
significant uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of statutory agreements against third parties and 
their interaction with traditional property interests such as mortgages and leases. The wide discretion 
afforded to parties to insert their own terms will also lead to transaction costs for third parties who are 
involved in dealings with the relevant land. Third parties will incur the costs of discovering what 
rights exist in the asset (search costs) and the costs of assessing the scope and attributes of the rights 
(measurement costs). This is compounded by the fact that the existence and contents of a statutory 
agreement may not be noted on the land title register.  
 
Information regarding statutory agreements and other forms of rights to carbon must be available to 
the public, particularly third parties who may have dealings with the relevant land. This may be 
achieved through legislation mandating that state land title registers accurately reflect any new forms 
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of rights or restrictions over private land. For example, it should be mandatory for novel restrictions 
imposed under the Carbon Farming Act, such as carbon maintenance obligations, to be recorded on 
the state land title register or land information system.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6: ALLOCATION OF LONG-TERM RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PROJECTS ACROSS THE CARBON CYCLE 
The long-term risks of environmental harm cannot be adequately managed through tortious or 
contractual means. To protect the public interest over the longer term, responsibility for 
environmental harm from extraction and sequestration activities must be clearly allocated by statute.  
 
Geosequestration projects and coal seam gas projects carry long-term risks of environmental harm. 
Biosequestration and geosequestration projects also require imposition of long-term responsibilities to 
ensure that carbon remains permanently sequestered in the carbon pool. The time frame for 
responsibilities to ensure that carbon remains sequestered will extend to one hundred years or more 
for a biosequestration project, and until the end of the site closure period for a geosequestration 
project. Proponents of geosequestration projects will face the additional challenge of uncertainty 
surrounding the thresholds and timing of site closure.  
Long-term responsibilities for environmental harm, or reversal of carbon sequestration, cannot be 
adequately managed through contract or tortious means. Legislation must clearly allocate long-term 
responsibilities for environmental harm resulting from geosequestration and coal seam gas extraction 
projects. Clear allocation of responsibilities will protect the public interest over the longer term, and 
increase certainty and encourage commercial investment in sequestration projects. 
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11. Glossary 
Biosequestration – absorption of carbon dioxide by trees, vegetation, soil and other organic plant 
matter. 
Carbon Farming Initiative – the Australian Government’s scheme to encourage farmers and land 
managers to earn carbon credits by storing carbon or reducing greenhouse gas emissions on the land. 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism – the Australian Government’s mechanism for placing a price on carbon 
dioxide emissions. The mechanism is comprised of: (a) a fixed price of carbon for three years from 1 
July 2012 to 1 July 2015; and (b) an emissions trading scheme from 1 July 2015 onwards. The 
mechanism only applies to certain entities.  
Clean Energy Regulator – the Australian Government entity responsible for administering legislation 
that will reduce carbon emissions and increase the use of clean energy. 
Climate Change – a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that 
alters the composition of the global atmosphere.
388
  
Ecologically Sustainable Development – development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
389
 
Geosequestration – injection and permanent storage of carbon dioxide into underground geological 
formations. Commonly referred to as ‘carbon capture and storage’.  
Kyoto Protocol – an international treaty made under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. It sets binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for each developed 
country, although not all countries have ratified the Protocol.  
Mitigation – avoiding or reducing the severity or intensity. Used in the context of mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions or the impacts of climate change throughout this report.  
Transaction costs – transaction costs include the cost of discovering what rights exist in an asset 
(search costs), assessing the scope and attributes of the rights (measurement costs) and negotiating to 
acquire them (bargaining costs).  
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – an international environmental treaty 
aimed at addressing climate change and stabilising atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
388 UNFCCC art 1(2).  
389 Bruntlandt Report at ch 2. 
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